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THE TUG OF WAR: COMBATANT STATUS 
REVIEW TRIBUNALS AND THE STRUGGLE 
TO BALANCE NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES DURING THE 
WAR ON TERROR 
Doran G. Arik* 
There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and 
justice which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic 
excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude of those who 
wield the physical resources of the community. Such 
principles were made by no human hands; indeed, if they 
did not antedate deity itself, they will so express its nature 
as to bind and control it. They are external to all Will as 
such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They are eternal 
and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws 
are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters 
indifferent, merely a record or transcript, and their 
enactment an act not of will or power but one of discovery 
and declaration.1 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Georgetown University, 
2004. The author wishes to thank her mom for providing unending 
encouragement and editing assistance, and Becky Wasserman for keeping her 
company in the library all year. She would also like to express her gratitude to 
Professors Jason Mazzone and Aliza Kaplan for providing conceptual guidance 
during the writing process, as well as the members of the Journal of Law and 
Policy for all their hard work.  
1 Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American 
Constitutional Law, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 67, 70 (Randy 
E. Barnett ed., 1989) (internal italics omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The three branches of the American government have been 
wrangling over the rights of non-citizen detainees held at the U.S. 
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba2 ever since the government 
began sending suspected terrorists there in 2002.3 Times of war 
often give rise to internal struggles within government as the 
nation’s leadership attempts to maintain a delicate balance between 
the equally important yet competing interests of defending national 
security and individual liberty. The terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 unquestionably placed new and different pressures on the 
American government; an attack on American soil heightened the 
government’s responsibility to preserve and protect the nation. 
National defense and individual liberty are not mutually exclusive 
interests, however, and unfortunately the American government 
has thus far been unable to strike the appropriate balance between 
the two initiatives. The result is perhaps best described as a six-
year tug-of-war between Congress and the Executive on the one 
hand and the Supreme Court on the other. 
Almost immediately after the United States brought the first 
suspected terrorists to Guantanamo in January of 2002,4 detainees 
                                                           
2 See Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at A10. 
3 On several occasions, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to seek a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court challenging the legality of one’s detention 
extends to Guantanamo detainees, while Congress, under political pressure from 
both its own members and the Administration, effectively legislated to overturn 
those decisions. After the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004), that non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo have the right to petition 
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress 
passed the Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) which stripped federal courts of 
their jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions. See infra note 47 and 
accompanying text. Then, after the Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), that the DTA did not apply to habeas petitions already 
pending when the DTA was enacted, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act (“MCA”) which explicitly and effectively stripped federal 
courts of any and all jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions. See infra text 
accompanying notes 53–54. 
4 Vogel, supra note 2. 
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began petitioning federal courts for writs of habeas corpus to 
challenge the legality of their detentions on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds.5 However, each time the Supreme Court held 
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, commonly referred to as the habeas statute, 
extended to alien detainees held at Guantanamo,6 Congress 
responded with legislation to strip federal courts of their 
jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions.7 Without access to 
federal courts through habeas petitions, each detainee must instead 
rely on the limited review process that accompanies his individual 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”)—a process hastily 
created by the Department of Defense (“DOD”) in 2004 to review 
detainees’ enemy combatant status designations. Under the 
Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) and Military Commissions Act 
(“MCA”), a detainee at Guantanamo may only seek review in the 
D.C. Circuit Court as to whether the CSRT in his case properly 
                                                           
5 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by 
aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States), aff’d by Al-
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d, Rasul, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that Guantanamo detainees have the right to file 
habeas petitions in federal court to challenge the legality of their detentions 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
6 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 (holding that detainees at Guantanamo have 
the right to petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus under the habeas 
statute for a review of the legality of their detentions); see also Hamdan, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2769 (concluding that restrictions imposed on detainees’ right to file 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus in federal court by Congress in the DTA did 
not apply to cases already pending when the DTA was passed). 
7 Congress first attempted to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
detainees’ habeas petitions in the wake of Rasul when it passed the DTA in 
2005. See Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 
Title X, Matters Relating to Detainees, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 
(2005) [hereinafter Detainee Treatment Act]. Then in 2006 the Supreme Court 
ruled in Hamdan that the DTA did not apply to cases already pending when the 
law was enacted. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749. In response, Congress passed 
the MCA, effectively and completely withdrawing detainees’ right to file habeas 
petitions in federal court. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-
366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
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followed DOD standards and procedures.8 This limited review 
prevents any examination of the underlying legitimacy of CSRT 
procedures, despite the fact that the process denies detainees 
bedrock procedural guarantees at the core of the American legal 
system.9 
In stripping federal courts of their jurisdiction over detainees’ 
habeas petitions, the Administration strenuously maintains, and 
Congress has thus far seemingly agreed, that because Guantanamo 
detainees are non-citizens captured and detained abroad, U.S. 
constitutional rights do not extend to them.10 Such an argument 
presupposes that constitutional rights exist in a vacuum, and fails 
to take into account both the core principles underlying 
constitutional guarantees and the historical purpose for their 
inclusion in the Constitution. 
The Framers recognized certain rights as deriving from natural 
law, and intended the Constitution to serve as the protector, not the 
                                                           
8 “The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit . . . shall be limited to the consideration of—whether the 
status determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with regard to 
such alien was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the 
Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals . . . .” Detainee 
Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2)(C). The MCA left this portion of the DTA 
unchanged when it was subsequently enacted in 2006. See Military 
Commissions Act.  
9 Judge Joyce Green of the D.C. District Court, before whom many 
detainees have appeared after filing petitions, lamented in her disposition of one 
group of consolidated cases that, “CSRTs are unconstitutional for failing to 
comport with the requirements of due process.” In re Guantanamo Detainee 
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, Boumediene v. 
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. and reh’g granted, 127 S. Ct. 
3078 (2007). 
10 See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990–91; see generally Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). This Note does not examine whether specific 
constitutional rights as such should extend to detainees held at Guantanamo. 
Rather, the discussion here is limited to an examination of the degree to which 
natural law and founding principles require that a minimum procedural standard 
be met in order to preserve fundamental constitutional values. The analysis 
undertaken here does not imply an assumption of the constitutionality, or 
unconstitutionality, of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA and 
MCA. 
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creator, of those rights.11 Indeed, the liberty rights as recognized by 
the Framers did not originate in the Constitution, but rather were 
deemed natural rights that predated its ratification.12 More than 
simply conferring certain rights on American citizens, the 
constitutional guarantees of due process and habeas corpus serve to 
“preserve unimpaired the . . . safeguards of civil liberty.”13 
Because protecting against “interferences with the individual’s 
right to liberty is . . . one of the fundamental principles of a 
democratic society,”14 such a goal cannot be limited to citizens. 
Unchecked attempts to curtail individual liberty—regardless of 
citizenry—will irreparably undermine our democratic foundations. 
Preserving safeguards of civil liberties thus must be a universal 
imperative. 
This Note argues that the CSRT process cobbled together by 
the DOD undermines the fundamental tenet of individual liberty, 
which sits at the core of the American legal system. Part I of this 
Note provides the history of detention at Guantanamo and 
examines detainees’ challenges to their detentions coupled with the 
varying responses by Congress and the courts. Part II examines the 
natural law principles that underlie specific guarantees provided in 
the Constitution and the degree to which such principles lend 
legitimacy to the American legal system. Part III presents a more 
detailed examination of the CSRT system and analyzes how the 
inherent problems therein undermine the role of natural law 
                                                           
11 See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What 
it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter The Ninth Amendment] (arguing 
that “individual natural rights existed prior to the Bill of Rights”); see also 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
12 See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment 
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074–80 (1991) (arguing that the 
Framers of the American Constitution shared a strong belief in natural rights, 
including but not limited to the right to liberty, and understood natural rights to 
“come from God rather than the government”). 
13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2772 (2006) (quoting Ex Parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)). 
14 Brief of Amici Curiae Specialists in Israeli Military Law and 
Constitutional Law in Support of Petitioners at 10, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 
06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter 
Brief of Specialists in Israeli Military Law]. 
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principles in the American constitutional system. Finally, Part IV 
provides a survey of recent and pending developments, arguing 
that the most effective method for remedying the problems with 
the current process for examining detainees’ detention, and by 
extension for striking an appropriate balance between preserving 
core American principles and protecting our national security 
interests, lies in congressional action that respects Supreme Court 
mandates. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO—A 
TIMELINE 
A. Arrival and Detention 
Within one week of September 11, 2001,15 Congress passed a 
joint resolution authorizing the President to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force . . . to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States.”16 Shortly after U.S. troops 
                                                           
15 On Sept. 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four planes, crashing two aircraft 
into the Twin Towers in New York City, and another into the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. See Mitchell Zuckoff & Matthew Brelis, Thousands Feared 
Dead After Planes Hit Towers, Pentagon, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 2001, at 
A1. 
16 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, P.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). The Authorization for the Use of Military Force, a joint resolution 
of Congress, granted the specific statutory authorization that the President 
needed, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, in order to initiate military 
action first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The 93rd Congress passed the War 
Powers Resolution in 1973 to “insure that the collective judgment of both 
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
[military] into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” War Powers Resolution, 
Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). Section 8(a) of the resolution vests 
authority to introduce American troops into hostilities only pursuant to specific 
statutory authorization. Id. See also George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 
The White House, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001),   
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-
8.html [hereinafter Presidential Address to the Nation]. 
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initiated the first strike in Afghanistan,17 President Bush issued a 
military order giving the Secretary of Defense detention and trial 
authority over individuals captured by the United States and 
outlining minimum provisional and procedural guarantees for 
detainees.18 
In January of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
announced that the military was “making preparations” to send 
detainees to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.19 One 
week later, the first of several hundred detainees arrived there.20 
Though the President’s Military Order authorized Secretary 
Rumsfeld to regulate detainees’ trials,21 Secretary Rumsfeld made 
clear at that time that there were “no plans to hold any kind of 
tribunal [in Guantanamo].”22 
                                                           
17 On October 7, 2001 the United States military began strikes, pursuant to 
President Bush’s order, “against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military 
installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.” Presidential Address to the 
Nation, supra note 16. 
18 For example, the order mandated that detainees be treated humanely, be 
afforded adequate food and water, and be allowed to practice their religion freely. 
In addition, the order provided that detainees were to be given a “full and fair 
trial” subject to the “rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military 
commissions.” Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the U.S., The 
White House, President Issues Military Order: Detention, Treatment and Trial 
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-
27.html [hereinafter President’s Military Order]. 
19 Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD News Briefing 
(Dec. 27, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. 
aspx?transcriptid=2696 [hereinafter DOD Briefing]. 
20 See Vogel, supra note 2. 
21 The President’s Military Order authorized the Secretary of Defense to 
appoint military commissions and issue any other orders and regulations 
deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the Order. See President’s 
Military Order, supra note 18. 
22 DOD Briefing, supra note 19. 
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B.  Initial Challenges 
Almost immediately after terrorism suspects arrived at 
Guantanamo, detainees began to seek judicial review of their 
detentions by filing habeas petitions in federal court.23 Detainees 
argued that they did not fight against the United States, that they 
were never “supporter[s] of the Taliban or any terrorist 
organization,” and that their detentions were therefore unlawful.24 
In response, the government argued that U.S. courts lacked 
jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions brought by non-citizens 
captured and detained abroad.25 The D.C. District Court agreed, 
and granted the government’s motion to dismiss the detainees’ 
petitions.26 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the District Court’s 
decision to grant the government’s motion to dismiss.27 However, 
in 2004 the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower 
courts, holding in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. courts do have 
                                                           
23 For example, petitioners in Rasul v. Bush first filed their habeas petition 
in D.C. District Court on February 19, 2002. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 
55, 57 (D.D.C. 2002). The action before the District Court was a consolidation 
of two cases, Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States. Later appeals in that 
action to the D.C. Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court are 
referenced by varying captions, including both Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. 
United States. 
24 Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
25 Id. at 56. 
26 Id. at 57. The District Court looked to earlier precedent, and held that 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), was controlling. In Johnson, the 
Supreme Court dismissed habeas petitions filed by German nationals captured 
and tried in China during World War II and subsequently detained at a military 
prison in Germany. See id. In dismissing their habeas petitions for lack of 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the writ of habeas corpus did not 
extend to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Id. at 
778. The District Court in Rasul held that, like in Johnson, the writ of habeas 
corpus did not extend to detainees held at Guantanamo because Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba is “outside the sovereign territory of the United States,” and thus the 
Court lacked jurisdiction. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72–73. 
27 Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(on appeal from Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55). 
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jurisdiction under the habeas statute to consider challenges to the 
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and 
detained at Guantanamo.28 That same day, in another similar case, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court held that Congress’ Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) provided the necessary 
authorization to detain, but that detainees must be afforded the 
opportunity to appeal an enemy combatant status determination.29 
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul affirming 
detainees’ right to challenge the legality of their detention by filing 
habeas petitions, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
issued a memorandum establishing CSRTs and outlining the 
procedures required therein.30 Specifically, CSRT proceedings were 
to operate under the presumption that each detainee was an enemy 
combatant.31 CSRTs were billed as an opportunity for a detainee to 
                                                           
28 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). In practice, the Supreme 
Court’s disposition in Rasul meant that detainees’ petitions for habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia could no longer be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
29 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004). Hamdi involved a 
habeas petition brought by a United States citizen who was captured in 
Afghanistan, classified as an enemy combatant and detained at a navy brig in 
South Carolina. See id. In Hamdi the Court was confronted with whether a 
United States citizen could be detained as an enemy combatant without being 
formally charged. Id. at 509. A plurality of Justices held that while a citizen 
could be detained, due process requires that he be given a “meaningful 
opportunity” to contest the factual basis of his detention. See id. Though the 
case dealt with the rights of a detained U.S. citizen, the applicability of this case 
lies in the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF passed by Congress in 2001 
did in fact authorize the United States government to hold detainees without 
charging them. Id. 
30 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of 
Def. on Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the Sec’y of 
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memorandum]. 
31 The Wolfowitz Memorandum defines the term “enemy combatant” as 
“an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act 
or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” See id. 
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challenge that determination.32 Pursuant to the Wolfowitz 
Memorandum, panels of commissioned military officers were 
directed to review each detainee’s enemy combatant status 
designation based upon a record prepared by a designated 
“Recorder,” which consisted of “reasonably available information 
generated in connection with the initial determination to hold the 
detainee as an enemy combatant . . . as well as any reasonably 
available records, determinations, or reports generated in 
connection therewith.”33 The memorandum provided that detainees 
were permitted to attend proceedings accompanied by an 
interpreter and a “Personal Representative,”34 and to call 
“reasonably available” witnesses.35  
CSRT panels are not bound by traditional rules of evidence, but 
rather may consider “any information it deems relevant and helpful 
. . . [and] may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the 
reliability of such evidence in the circumstances.”36 In determining 
whether detainees were properly designated as enemy combatants, 
CSRT panels were directed to base their decisions on the 
“preponderance of the evidence,” with the caveat that the panel 
                                                           
32 The Wolfowitz Memorandum outlined various procedures that would 
govern CSRT review of a detainee’s enemy combatant status determination, and 
provided, amongst other things, that detainees would be given an “opportunity 
to contest designation as an enemy combatant . . . [and to] consult with and be 
assisted by a personal representative.” Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Id. The “Personal Representative” was authorized to assist the 
detainee in his CSRT. Implementing guidelines issued by the Secretary of the 
Navy clarified that the Personal Representative was not to serve as an advocate 
for the detainee but rather his role was merely to explain the nature of the 
proceedings. Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, U.S. 
Dep’t of Def. on Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba 
(July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040730comb.pdf [hereinafter England Memorandum]. 
35 The CSRT panel has the authority, pursuant to the Wolfowitz 
Memorandum, to determine the “reasonable availability” of witnesses, and 
provides that written statements may be substituted if a witness is deemed not 
reasonably available. See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30. 
36 Id. 
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would accord the government’s evidence presented against a 
detainee a presumption of validity.37 Although the Wolfowitz 
Memorandum explicitly preserved detainees’ right to petition U.S. 
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus,38 the government would 
later contest that right in subsequent litigation.39 
In the months following the Rasul decision, detainees filed 
numerous habeas petitions in federal court,40 many but not all of 
which were consolidated in D.C. District Court to facilitate 
proceedings.41 While these consolidations were meant to create a 
smoother, more uniform process, in reality there were huge 
inconsistencies in the way district court judges interpreted 
detainees’ rights in the different groups of cases.42 For example, in 
                                                           
37 Id. 
38 Id. In fact, detainees were reportedly advised on three separate occasions 
of their right to seek writs of habeas corpus in federal court. Mark Denbeaux & 
Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings—CSRT: The Modern Habeas 
Corpus? 12 Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 951245 (2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951245. 
39 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see also Boumediene 
v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. argued 
Dec. 5, 2007). 
40 Many of these petitions have since become well known, including those 
filed on behalf of Jose Padilla and Salim Hamdan. Individual petitions were 
often filed by “next friends” on behalf of many detainees. Though “next friend” 
status at times posed problems of standing, Gherebi v. Bush, 338 F. Supp. 2d 
91 (D.D.C. 2004), such a standing discussion is outside the scope of this Note. 
41 After the Supreme Court held in Rasul that proper jurisdiction for 
detainees’ habeas petitions lay in the District Court in Washington, D.C., the 
government filed a motion to coordinate detainees’ numerous pending petitions. 
In August of 2004, the Calendar and Case Management Committee for the D.C. 
District Court designated Judge Joyce Green to “coordinate and manage all 
proceedings in these matters [of Guantanamo detainees] and to the extent 
necessary rule on common procedural and substantive issues.” Gherebi, 338 F. 
Supp. 2d at 94. The Committee’s order was affirmed by an Executive Session of 
the D.C. District Court on September 14, 2004. Id. Judge Leon of the D.C. 
District Court, however, chose not to transfer the pending cases on his docket. 
As such, he retained the cases collectively known as Boumediene v. Bush, 
currently pending before the Supreme Court. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 
355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 452 n.14 (D.D.C. 2005). 
42 Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting 
the government’s motion to dismiss detainees’ habeas petitions because 
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one group of cases Judge Richard Leon of the D.C. District Court 
granted the government’s motion to dismiss the petitions on the 
ground that there “was no viable legal theory under which a federal 
court could issue a writ of habeas corpus”43 even though detainees 
technically had the right to petition the court for such writs. Judge 
Leon reasoned that irrespective of detainees’ rights to petition a 
court for a writ of habeas corpus, they had no legally enforceable 
constitutional rights on which a federal court could actually issue a 
writ. In contrast, only one week later in another group of 
consolidated cases,44 Judge Joyce Green of the D.C. District Court 
denied similar motions to dismiss filed by the government, finding 
that “Guantanamo detainees are entitled to due process under the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”45 
C.  Congressional Response 
Congress swiftly responded to the wave of petitions filed by 
detainees. Following the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the 
right of Guantanamo detainees to petition federal courts for writs 
of habeas corpus, Congress amended the habeas statute.46 The 
                                                           
detainees had no substantive constitutional rights on which the court could issue 
a writ), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 
2005) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss detainees’ habeas petitions 
because the D.C. District Court was the appropriate forum for their resolution). 
43 Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
44 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
45 Id. at 465. After Judge Green denied the government’s motion to 
dismiss, the government filed a motion for a protective order to prevent 
disclosure of certain information to detainees and their counsel, and further limit 
contact between detainees and their counsel. The D.C. District Court ultimately 
issued a protective order that laid out the scope of attorney-client contact and the 
extent to which the government was entitled to restrict access to classified 
documents. The Green Protective Order, named for Judge Green who authored 
the opinion, was largely followed until its scope was challenged two years later 
in Bismullah v. Gates. See Bismullah v. Gates (Bismullah I), 501 F.3d 178 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
46 Section 1005(e)(1) of the DTA expressly amends the habeas statute to 
strip federal courts of their jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by detainees at 
Guantanamo. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 
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DTA, which was signed into law by President Bush on December 
30, 2005, prevented any United States court from exercising 
jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by 
detainees held at Guantanamo.47 As an alternative, the DTA 
                                                           
(2005). 
47 Detainee Treatment Act § 1005. Congress enacted the DTA as part of an 
emergency supplemental appropriations package to the fiscal year 2006 
Department of Defense appropriations bill. Relevant portions of the DTA are 
found in Section 1005: 
(e) Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants- 
  (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 2241 of title 28, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 
 “(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider— 
  “(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or 
  “(2) any other action against the United States or its agents 
relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of 
Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who— 
 “(A) is currently in military custody; or 
  “(B) has been determined by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly 
detained as an enemy combatant.”. 
  (2) REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNALS OF PROPRIETY OF DETENTION.— 
  (A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraphs (B), (C), and 
(D), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an 
enemy combatant. 
  (B) LIMITATION ON CLAIMS.—The jurisdiction of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit under this paragraph shall be limited to claims brought 
by or on behalf of an alien— 
  (i) who is, at the time a request for review by such 
court is filed, detained by the Department of Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and 
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allowed for judicial review of CSRT determinations exclusively in 
the D.C. Circuit Court.48 The legislative history of the DTA makes 
clear that Congress’ goal was to deny detainees at Guantanamo any 
rights to petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus, thereby 
negating the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rasul.49 
The Supreme Court, however, balked at Congress’ move to 
eliminate its jurisdiction. Six months after the DTA was signed into 
law, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld50 that the DTA “did 
not strip federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases pending on the date 
of the DTA’s enactment.”51 The Court gave import to the fact that 
no provision of the DTA explicitly applied to pending cases, 
noting that Congress “chose not to so provide—after being 
                                                           
  (ii) for whom a Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
has been conducted, pursuant to applicable procedures 
specified by the Secretary of Defense. 
  (C) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—The jurisdiction of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph 
shall be limited to the consideration of— 
  (i) whether the status determination of the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was 
consistent with the standards and procedures specified by 
the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion 
of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the Government’s evidence); and 
  (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United 
States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and 
procedures to make the determination is consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Detainee Treatment Act § 1005. 
48 Detainee Treatment Act § 1005. 
49 Senator Lindsey Graham’s statement during the Senate’s consideration of 
the National Defense Authorization Conference Report, of which the DTA was a 
part, is just one example of similar statements indicating Congress’ intent to 
expressly respond to the Rasul decision. 151 CONG. R. S14256 (daily ed. Dec. 
21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (“Since the Rasul decision was based on 
the habeas statute in the U.S. Code, I am very comfortable amending that statute 
as a proper congressional response to the Court’s decision.”). 
50 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
51 Id. at 2769 n.15 (emphasis added). 
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presented with the option—for [a provision to deal with pending 
cases] . . . [and that] omission is an integral part of the statutory 
scheme.”52 In effect, the Court’s decision invalidated any habeas 
corpus petition that was pending when the DTA was enacted. 
The struggle between Congress and the Court continued. 
Congress responded to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan that the DTA 
did not apply to pending cases by passing the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006.53 The legislation again amended the 
habeas statute, this time explicitly stripping federal courts of 
jurisdiction over any and all habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo 
detainees, and again limiting the scope of review to CSRT 
procedures.54 Congress spoke directly to the Court’s decision in 
                                                           
52 Id. at 2769. 
53 Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (2006). As Judge Randolph of the D.C. Circuit Court notably pointed out, 
“one of the primary purposes of the MCA was to overrule Hamdan.” 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
54 Military Commissions Act §7(a). The stated purpose of the 
comprehensive law was “to authorize trial by military commission for 
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.” §7(a). When President 
Bush signed the MCA into law, he called it “one of the most important pieces 
of legislation in the war on terror.” Press Release, George W. Bush, President of 
the United States, The White House, President Bush Signs Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html.  
 President Bush also described the law as providing “a way to deliver 
justice to the terrorists we have captured . . . [with] a fair trial, in which the 
accused are presumed innocent, have access to an attorney, and can hear all the 
evidence against them. These military commissions are lawful, they are fair, and 
they are necessary.” Id. President Bush’s description is accurate only insofar as 
it describes the military commissions authorized by the law, but his statement 
should not be read to encompass the provisions of the MCA that strip federal 
courts of their jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo detainees’ habeas petitions or 
those that codify CSRTs and the D.C. Circuit’s appellate review authority. 
 The relevant portion of the MCA is found in Section 7, entitled Habeas 
Corpus Matters: 
 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, 
is amended by striking both the subsection (e) added by section 
1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109–148 (119 Stat. 2742) and the sub- 
section (e) added by added by section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law 
109–163 (119 Stat. 3477) and inserting the following new subsection 
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Hamdan with Section 7(b), which explicitly dealt with pending 
cases and stated that the amendment to the habeas statute “shall 
apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.”55 The plain language of the statute 
foreclosed any further arguments that pending cases fell outside the 
scope of the legislation.56 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit Court 
was left with the limited power to review only whether a CSRT 
complied with its own procedures.57 
                                                           
(e): 
 “(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to 
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed 
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who 
has been determined by the United States to have been properly 
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. 
 “(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 
note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear 
or consider any other action against the United States or its agents 
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, 
or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained 
by the United States and has been determined by the United 
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant 
or is awaiting such determination.”. 
 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) 
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect 
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention 
of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 
2001. 
Military Commissions Act § 7. 
55 Military Commissions Act § 7 (emphasis added). 
56 The Congressional Record reveals numerous statements making clear 
that, “[w]ithout exception, both the proponents and opponents of section 7 [of 
the MCA] understood the provision to eliminate habeas jurisdiction over 
pending cases.” Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(internal citations omitted), cert and reh’g granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29, 
2007). 
57 The Court was thus limited under the DTA and MCA to a narrow 
review of the procedures afforded to detainees during the D.C. Circuit’s 
examination on appeal of an individual CSRT proceeding, rather than a broader 
analysis of the processes detainees should be afforded during the underlying 
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While Congress attempted to act with sufficient intent to quell 
future challenges, the struggle continued. In 2006, a group of 
detainees58 invoked the limited statutory review permitted by the 
                                                           
CSRT process itself. 
58 One group of detainees, petitioners in Parhat v. Gates, are seven 
Uighursa Muslim ethnic minority from western China subject to religious 
and political persecution by the Communist regime. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2004—CHINA (Feb. 28, 
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm.  
 According to the State Department, the “[Chinese] Government used the 
international war on terror as a pretext for cracking down harshly on suspected 
Uighur separatists expressing peaceful political dissent.” Id. Petitioners fled 
persecution to an Uighur expatriate village in the mountains of Afghanistan near 
the Pakistan border. Petition for Immediate Release and Other Relief Under 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and, in the Alternative, for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus at 13–14, Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-1397 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2006) 
[hereinafter Petition for Release]. After the village was bombed in October, 
2001, the Uighurs crossed into Pakistan and were taken in by local villagers 
who later turned them over to the U.S. military, along with the other Uighurs 
in the village, in exchange for a $5,000 bounty per Uighur. Id. at 15.  
 Despite public exculpatory statements made on behalf of the Parhat 
petitioners, including a United States Ambassador and a colonel in the United 
States military, CSRT panels found that each was properly designated an enemy 
combatant. Respondents’ Joint Opposition to the Application for a Stay of the 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Until 14 
Days After Disposition of this Case and Consent to the Motion for Expedited 
Consideration of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and for Expedited Merits 
Briefing and Oral Argument in the Event that the Court Grants the Petition at 
8–9, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07A-677 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter 
Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief]. The eighth petitioner, Haji Bismullah, is 
an Afghan national who fled Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1996 when the Taliban 
came to power. Id. at 5. Bismullah returned to Afghanistan along with his 
brothers after Hamid Karzai came to power to “help U.S. and coalition forces 
defeat the Taliban,” and was later appointed as a transportation minister under 
Karzai’s government. Id. at 5–6. American forces mistakenly arrested him in 
2003, and “despite assurances of his innocence from the Afghan government, the 
military transferred Bismullah to Bagram Air Base and then Guantanamo” where 
a CSRT found he was properly designated as an enemy combatant. Conference 
Call: Another Detainee Case Heads to High Court, Courtwatch—Justices 
Asked to Take Case of Prisoners Seeking Evidence Government Used to Declare 
Them ‘Enemy Combatants’, LEGAL TIMES, March 10, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter 
Conference Call]. 
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DTA and MCA to challenge their CSRTs and enemy combatant 
status designations in the D.C. Circuit Court.59 After months of 
briefing, largely regarding the scope and type of evidence the court 
may consider in conducting its review, a unanimous panel of the 
D.C. Circuit dealt a blow to the government by ruling that it must 
provide to the reviewing court all the information “reasonably 
available” to the government relevant to a detainee, as opposed to 
the smaller subset of evidence presented at his CSRT as the 
government had urged.60 Although the government subsequently 
sought a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court’s ruling imposed 
too substantial a burden and would endanger national security, the 
D.C. Circuit Court declined to rehear the case in February 2008.61 
In the meantime, another group of detainees mounted a 
challenge to the court-stripping provision of the DTA and MCA 
itself. In December 2007, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
in the companion cases Boumediene v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United 
States,62 wherein petitioner detainees argued that they are entitled 
to habeas rights under the United States Constitution, and that the 
CSRT process along with judicial review in the D.C. Circuit is not 
an adequate and effective alternative.63 The government, in 
contrast, maintained that the right to petition a federal court for a 
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to non-citizen detainees at 
Guantanamo and that the procedures afforded by the DTA and 
MCA are more than adequate.64 
Boumediene’s pendency in the Supreme Court afforded the 
                                                           
59 Petitioner in Bismullah v. Gates filed an appeal from his Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal on June 9, 2006. Petitioners in Parhat v. Gates filed 
their own appeals on December 4, 2006. After considerable motion practice, the 
D.C. Circuit ordered that the two groups of cases be set for oral argument on the 
same day before the same panel. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
60 See id. 
61 Bismullah v. Gates (Bismullah III), 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
62 Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-
1196 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2007). 
63 Conference Call, supra note 58. 
64 Transcript of Oral Arguments, Boumediene, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah, No. 
06-1196 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2007). 
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government another angle in Bismullah after its petition for a 
rehearing en banc was denied. In February 2008, the government 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that 
until the Court decides the merits of the Boumediene case the 
government should not have to undertake the burdensome task of 
either compiling voluminous records as required by the D.C. 
Circuit’s July 2007 ruling or, instead, act on the court’s alternative 
suggestion of reconvening new CSRTs.65 As such, the government 
requested that the Supreme Court stay the D.C. Circuit’s judgment 
and hold the petition for certiorari in Bismullah until it renders a 
decision in Boumediene, or, alternatively, that the Court grant the 
petition for certiorari and set Bismullah on an expedited schedule 
so that the two cases may be decided together this term.66 For their 
part, detainees argued in a reply brief that the government’s 
petition to the Supreme Court is merely a veiled attempt to delay 
detainees’ cases brought under the DTA, and that a stay would 
“harm the interests of justice and serve no legitimate purpose.”67 
Although the Court was expected to consider the appeal at its 
private conference on March 14, 2008,68 no action has yet been 
taken. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, NATURAL LAW AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
Constitutional ratification debates and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence provide the background by which to understand the 
need to provide Guantanamo detainees with procedures that 
adequately respect constitutional principles. It is clear from the 
debates prior to ratification of the Constitution and the addition of 
the Bill of Rights that the Framers recognized that certain rights, 
                                                           
65 See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
66 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 32–33, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07-
1054 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2008). See also Conference Call, supra note 58. 
67 Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief, supra note 58, at 18. 
68 Lyle Denniston, U.S.: Time to Act Is Now On Detainee Case, 
SCOTUSblog.com, March 11, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/us-time-
to-act-now-on-detainee-case/. 
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namely liberty rights, were natural rights.69 
The Supreme Court has confirmed the importance of natural 
rights by making clear that even in the context of a national 
emergency, government encroachment upon natural and 
fundamental rights is only legitimate if it is sufficiently justified.70 
The Court’s historical view of the right to liberty was clearly 
embraced by Justice Harlan, who in 1883 recognized it as a 
“natural right of man” and encouraged a government policy that 
would acknowledge the Constitution as one “of government, 
founded by the people . . . for the establishment of justice, for the 
general welfare, and for a perpetuation of the blessings of 
liberty.”71 The government’s use of CSRTs in the context of the 
War on Terror fails to acknowledge that even Guantanamo 
detainees have a natural right to liberty. Though the government’s 
national security rationale for its CSRT policy may be legitimate, 
the government nevertheless insufficiently justifies the extent of its 
encroachment. The government’s failure to adhere to its great 
responsibility of protecting liberty has thus undermined our own 
constitutional system. 
A.  The Framers and Natural Rights 
The Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights, is an expression 
of principles as well as an enumeration of specific guarantees.72 
These principles reflect the Framers’ objective to secure individual 
                                                           
69 See The Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 55–60. While the Framers 
explicitly enumerated certain rights in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, they 
understood that those documents “did not create or generate many of the rights 
they secured. Rather, they merely re-stated, or declared, the rights that the 
people already possessed.” Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of 
Classical Legal Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law and 
the Court Over the Constitution, 75 CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2007) (internal 
citations omitted). 
70 See Home Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); 
see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
71 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48–49, 52 (1883) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
72 Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION 13, 16 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
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liberty,73 and can perhaps best be understood according to an 
“individual natural rights model” of constitutional interpretation.74 
Accordingly, certain rights predate the Constitution rather than the 
Constitution establishing rights to be derived from the document 
itself.75 Although Federalists and their opponents may have 
disagreed about whether to include a Bill of Rights,76 they 
nonetheless agreed that inherent individual rights, namely individual 
liberty, were natural rights that did not derive from the 
Constitution.77 Thus the individual liberty right as understood by 
                                                           
73 Id. 
74 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
75 Similarly, the explicit enumeration of certain rights should not be 
construed to diminish those that are not expressly enumerated. Corwin, supra 
note 1, at 70–71 (“Principles of transcendental justice . . . [as understood in] 
terms of personal and private rights . . . is the same as that of the principles from 
which they spring and which they reflect. They owe nothing to their recognition 
in the Constitution—such recognition was necessary if the Constitution was to 
be regarded as complete.”). 
76 Though much debate surrounding the ratification of the Constitution 
hinged on the issue of whether or not to include the Bill of Rights in the final 
document—opponents of which argued that including it was both unnecessary 
and dangerous—it is widely accepted that both supporters and opponents shared 
a belief in natural rights. See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing 
Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), reprinted in JAMES MADISON, 
WRITINGS 437, 444 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (“[A] great number of the . . . 
champions for republican liberty, have thought such a provision, not only 
unnecessary, but . . . some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous.”); see 
also The Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 7–8, 27 (“Because the 
Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers, these enumerated 
limits constituted a bill of rights [, and] [b]y attempting to enumerate any rights 
to be protected, it would imply that all that were not listed were surrendered.”) 
(internal citations omitted). James Madison attempted to allay those fears when 
he explained the necessity of the Bill of Rights before the House of 
Representatives, stating that it would, “expressly declare the great rights of 
mankind secured under this constitution.” Madison, supra note 76, at 444. 
77 It is clear that the Framers understood natural rights—and specifically 
liberty rights—as rights possessed by all persons, not just citizens. For 
example, Theodore Sedgwick, a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention, objected to including in the Bill of Rights those that are “self-
evident, unalienable [and which] the people possess.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 
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the Framers may be invoked by all persons because of its status as 
a natural right rather than merely because it is explicitly protected 
under the Constitution.78 
B.  The Supreme Court, Natural Rights and National 
Emergencies79 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to seek a writ 
of habeas corpus as a safeguard of personal liberty against arbitrary 
government encroachment.80 Federal law provides the Executive the 
ability to respond to national emergencies using inherent or implied 
constitutional power or authority delegated from Congress;81 
however, the Supreme Court has instructed that even in times of 
                                                           
(Jospeh Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 1789).  
 The Framers’ understanding of individual liberty rights as broadly 
applicable is also evident in their explicit use of the words “men” and 
“mankind” during ratification debates. See, e.g., The Debates in the Convention 
of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 
4, 1781), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 415, 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1907) (remarks of James Wilson) at 27 (“Enumerate all the rights of men! I 
am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted 
such a thing.”). See also Rosen, supra note 12, at 1075. 
78 The inclusion of the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution is evidence 
of the Framers’ recognition of individual, natural and preexisting rights that, 
even if not enumerated in the Constitution itself, were nonetheless retained. The 
Ninth Amendment, supra note 11, at 13–14, 29. 
79 The term “national emergency” in the context of Executive power does 
not have a hard and fast definition, but has been interpreted by the Congress and 
the Supreme Court as the existence of unexpected and dangerous conditions that 
do not lend themselves to resolution according to precedent. HAROLD C. 
RELYEA, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 4 (Cong. Research Serv., Aug. 30, 
2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf. 
80 See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969) (“The writ of 
habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom 
against arbitrary and lawless state action.”). 
81 See Relyea, supra note 79, at 1. The Executive has used these powers to 
respond to emergency conditions as far back as 1792. Id. at 5. Until the 20th 
century, however, the power was largely unchallenged by Congress or the 
Supreme Court. Id. at 6–7. 
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national emergency, the government must shoulder the burden of 
justification when it seeks to curtail individual liberty or other 
constitutional rights.82 
 i. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell and the 
Great Depression83 
The Supreme Court required the government to carry the 
burden of justification in the 1934 case Home Building and Loan 
Association v. Blaisdell.84 In response to widespread 
unemployment and mortgage foreclosures, as well as low wages 
and poor credit, the Minnesota state legislature passed a statute 
that allowed individuals facing foreclosure to petition a state court 
to postpone the sale of their homes and to extend the statutory 
redemption period.85 Pursuant to this statute, individuals who had 
defaulted on their mortgage and whose property had been 
foreclosed petitioned a Minnesota state court for an extension of 
                                                           
82 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939) (“[W]here legislative 
abridgment of [fundamental] rights is asserted . . . the delicate and difficult task 
falls upon the courts to . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced 
[by the government] in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the 
rights.”). 
83 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell came before the Court 
during the severe economic depression of the early 1930s. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
Against this backdrop, the Court characterized a national emergency as one that 
requires “limited and temporary interpositions [on constitutional rights] if made 
necessary by a great public calamity . . . [or] vital public interests would . . .  
suffer.” Id. at 439–40. 
84 See id. at 442 (“The Court also decided that while the declaration by the 
legislature as to the existence of the emergency was entitled to great respect, it 
was not conclusive . . . It is always open to judicial inquiry whether the 
exigency still exists upon which the continued operation of the law depends.”). 
85 Id. at 422 n.3, 424–25. “Redemption” refers to the legal right of a party 
who borrows money to purchase a property to regain ownership of that property 
after it has been sold at a foreclosure sale due to nonpayment. State statutes often 
give parties with mortgages a certain period of time to pay the amount for which 
the property was sold at the foreclosure sale—the “redemption period”—and 
typically parties are entitled to remain on the premises during that period of 
time. See 1 HON. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS § 8:21 (2007). 
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the redemption period.86 The court granted the extension, and the 
owner of the mortgage appealed on grounds that it violated the 
Constitution’s Contract Clause.87 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
upheld the state statute as a valid exercise of the government’s 
power to respond to an emergency, though it acknowledged that 
the statute impaired the obligations of the underlying mortgage 
contract.88 
On appeal, the Supreme Court looked to the historical 
understanding and interpretations of the Contract Clause for 
guidance.89 The Court recognized that in times of national 
emergency, the government may utilize its power to respond to 
exigent conditions, but that doing so “must be consistent with the 
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power.”90 By way 
of explanation, the Court analogized that, “the war power of the 
Federal Government is not created by the emergency of war, but it 
is a power given to meet that emergency . . . [however] even the 
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding 
                                                           
86 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 418–19. Petitioners argued that because of the 
economic depression, they were unable to redeem their property, and without 
relief from the court in the form of an extension, they would lose it. Id. at 419. 
87 Id. at 420. 
88 Id. at 420–21. 
89 The Court stated that because the constitutional grant and limitation of 
power in the Contract Clause was general, affording “a broad outline,” it was 
necessary to “fill in the details.” Id. at 426. The Court noted that although the 
debates in the Constitutional Convention did not provide guidance for 
interpreting the Contract Clause, the “reasons which led to the adoption of that 
clause . . . are not left in doubt . . . .” Id. at 427. The Court explained that debt 
and legislative interferences with private contracts were so widespread during the 
Revolutionary period as to undermine “the confidence essential to prosperous 
trade . . . and the utter destruction of credit was threatened.” Id. The inclusion of 
the Contract Clause was necessary both to preserve individual rights to contract 
and to limit the government’s power to encroach on that right. Id. at 427–28. 
The Court went on to examine prior courts’ interpretation and application of the 
Contract Clause in determining its scope, concluding that the Contract Clause 
“should not be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions” 
on individuals’ rights to enter into and enforce private contracts if the 
government is faced with a national emergency. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). 
90 Id. 
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essential liberties.”91 The Court ultimately upheld the statute, 
reasoning that government’s limited encroachment on the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution’s Contract Clause was permissible 
in light of the exigent circumstances presented by the severe 
economic recession.92  
While the Court made clear that “[e]mergency does not create 
power” and that the government may only act consistent with 
constitutional limitations,93 practical realities might require a 
compromise between individual rights—in this case, the right of the 
mortgage-holders to expect that their private contracts be 
enforced—and protecting the national interest.94 Such a 
compromise is legitimate so long as it is appropriately targeted to a 
particular emergency and conducted pursuant to reasonable 
conditions.95 Here, the Court found that the statute met those 
conditions, and thus that the government did not impermissibly 
encroach on the mortgage holders’ rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution’s Contract Clause. 
Like the state of emergency that existed in Blaisdell, the War on 
Terror presents conditions that call for a degree of deference to the 
government in its efforts to protect the national interest. Unlike in 
Blaisdell, however, the government’s CSRT policy is not a 
legitimate compromise between individual rights and protecting the 
national interest. While it appears clear that the government’s 
policy is sufficiently targeted to a particular exigency—the War on 
Terror—it is not conducted pursuant to reasonable conditions. 
                                                           
91 Id. at 426 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 444–47. 
93 Id. at 424. 
94 Id. at 440. 
95 The Court explained that the state statute was reasonable because the 
conditions on the extension of the redemption period did not undermine the 
integrity of the mortgage contract itself. Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 433 (1934). For example, the Court noted that interest 
continued to run on the contract, the validity of the foreclosure sale was 
maintained if the property-owner failed to redeem the property during the 
extension, and any other statutory conditions on redemption were left intact. Id. 
at 445–46. Moreover, the Court emphasized the fact that the state statute only 
postponed the redemption period to a specified date, and as a result the statute 
could not outlive the emergency for which it was created. Id. at 447. 
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While the statute in Blaisdell extended deadlines and left the 
underlying mortgage contract intact,96 the government’s CSRT 
policies do not merely limit detainees’ rights; rather, the policies 
arguably eliminate detainees’ rights altogether.97 Moreover, in 
Blaisdell, the government’s power to interfere with individuals’ 
contracts and grant extensions was subject to an articulated 
deadline whereas the government’s CSRT policy is not limited in 
duration.98 Because the government may detain individuals for the 
duration of the War on Terror99—which is essentially of indefinite 
duration100—and because every foreign national held at 
Guantanamo is subject to the CSRT process,101 there is no real 
limitation on the government’s power. Thus, while the War on 
Terror provides the government an important justification for its 
actions, any compromise between individual rights and national 
security must be subject to reasonable conditions in order to be 
legitimate. Mandating minimal procedural guarantees for detainees 
during the CSRT process would provide those conditions, and 
would thus form the basis for an acceptable compromise between 
                                                           
96 During the extension of the redemption period, the integrity of the 
mortgage contract remained intact, interest on it continued to run, the validity of 
the foreclosure sale as well as the right of the purchaser to obtain a deficiency 
judgment were maintained, and any other conditions on the redemption period 
pursuant to existing statutory law remained as they were prior to the extension. 
Id. at 433. 
97 CSRTs in practice do not provide detainees any real opportunity to 
challenge an enemy combatant designation. See infra Part III.C. 
98 The Court emphasized in Blaisdell that the statute in question was 
explicitly temporary. 290 U.S. at 439–40. In contrast, neither the Wolfowitz 
Memorandum outlining CSRTs nor the England Memorandum implementing 
them articulate any limit on their duration. See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra 
note 30; see also England Memorandum, supra note 34. 
99 In 2004, the Supreme Court said in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force authorizes the President to detain 
enemy combatants for the “duration of the conflict.” 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004). 
100 President Bush has acknowledged that the duration of the “War on 
Terror” is unknown, stating, “[w]e cannot know the duration of this war.” Press 
Release, George W. Bush, President of the U.S., The White House, President 
Submits Wartime Budget (March 25, 2003), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-2.html). 
101 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30. 
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individual rights and national security while legitimizing the 
government’s actions and conforming with fundamental 
constitutional principles. 
ii. United States v. Robel and the Communist Threat102 
Several decades after the Court’s landmark decision in Blaisdell, 
the Court again had the opportunity to examine the degree to which 
the government may curtail constitutional rights in the context of a 
national emergency. This time, the Cold War and the threat of 
Communism provided the impetus for government action. In 1967, 
in United States v. Robel, the Supreme Court examined the 
constitutionality of the Subversive Activities Control Act, which 
prohibited any member of a “Communist-action organization” from 
maintaining employment at a “defense facility.”103 The defendant 
was a member of the Communist party, and was subsequently 
prohibited from working at his job in a shipyard.104 The 
                                                           
102 In 1950, President Truman proclaimed a state of national emergency in 
response to the hostilities in Korea. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 
(Dec. 16, 1950). See also RELYEA, supra note 79, at 8. The state of emergency 
was not terminated at the end of the Korean conflict, however, due “to the 
continuance of the Cold War atmosphere which . . . made the imminent threat of 
hostilities an accepted fact of everyday life, with ‘emergency’ the normal state of 
affairs.” EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES: PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW NOW 
IN EFFECT DELEGATING TO THE EXECUTIVE EXTRAORDINARY AUTHORITY IN 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY at 5, S. REP. NO. 93-549 (1973) (Conf. Rep.) 
[hereinafter EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES]. In 1973, a Special Senate 
Committee charged with examining the use of emergency power during national 
emergencies recommended that Congress terminate the state of national 
emergency then in effect. See generally id. 
103 389 U.S. 258, 259 (1967). 
104 Id. at 260. The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 required the 
registration of Communist organizations with the Attorney General, and created 
the Subversive Activities Control Board which was charged with investigating 
people suspected of “un-American activities.” Laura K. Donohue, Article: 
Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
233, 246 (2005). In addition to general registration requirements, the Act 
provided that any member of a Communist organization under a final order to 
register was prohibited from working anywhere designated as a “defense facility” 
by the Secretary of Defense. Robel, 389 U.S. at 260. The defendant, Mr. Robel, 
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government justified the statute under “Congress’ war power . . . 
[as the] Court ha[d] given broad deference to the exercise of that 
constitutional power by the national legislature.”105 
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the 
government’s legitimate national security concerns106 but stated 
that the government had encroached too deeply on the 
constitutional right of association protected by the First 
Amendment.107 In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, 
the Court stated that, “the phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked 
as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional 
power which can be brought within its ambit.”108 The Court 
focused on the lack of a clear, rational connection between the 
defendant and the harm the government sought to prevent, as the 
statute established guilt on the basis of association with the 
Communist Party without requiring a showing that the individual 
actually posed a danger to the national interest.109 Congress’ 
concern over national defense was certainly not without merit—the 
1950s and early 1960s were the height of McCarthyism, and Cold 
War escalation as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 caused 
widespread security concerns throughout the country. 
Notwithstanding the fear and paranoia that marked the Cold War 
era,110 however, the Court stated that the statute itself imposed too 
                                                           
was a member of the Communist party employed at a shipyard in Seattle, 
Washington. Id. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense designated the shipyard in 
which the defendant worked as a defense facility, and his continued employment 
there subjected him to prosecution under the Act. Id. 
105 Id. at 263. 
106 Id. at 266–67. 
107 Id. at 264. Like the right to liberty, the right of assembly preserved by 
the First Amendment was also an individual natural right possessed by the 
people and which existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution. The Ninth 
Amendment, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
108 Id. 
109 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967). 
110 President Truman’s 1950 proclamation exemplified the widespread 
anxiety felt throughout the United States at the time: 
Whereas recent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat 
to the peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and 
those of the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict; 
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substantial a burden on the defendant’s legitimate constitutional 
rights.111 
Here, like in Robel, the government cannot justify its CSRT 
policy simply by pointing to the War on Terror. Certainly the 
government’s interest in protecting national security is as legitimate 
now as it was during the Cold War.112 Nevertheless, like the policy 
at issue in Robel, CSRTs often establish guilt by association 
without requiring the government to establish that a detainee 
actually poses the danger of which he is accused113—the Supreme 
Court explicitly held such a policy unjustifiable in Robel.114 
Moreover, just as in Robel, here there are feasible alternatives to 
                                                           
and Whereas world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of 
the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world; and 
Whereas, if the goal of communist imperialism were to be achieved, the 
people of this country would no longer enjoy the full and rich life they 
have . . . ; and Whereas, the increasing menace of the forces of 
communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United 
States be strengthened as speedily as possible. 
EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES, supra note 102 (quoting Proclamation No. 
2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 16, 1950)). 
111 Robel, 389 U.S. at 267–68 (“Our decision today . . . recognizes that, 
when legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a 
substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must 
achieve its goal by means which have a less drastic impact on the continued 
vitality of First Amendment freedoms . . . In this case, the means chosen by 
Congress are contrary to the letter and spirit of the First Amendment.”) (internal 
quotations and italics omitted). The existence of alternative methods to protect 
national security interests, such as prescribing criminal penalties, further 
restricting access to state secrets or positions in national defense industries, or a 
more thorough security screening program, presented Congress with just such 
“less drastic” means. Id. at 267. 
112 The 1950s and early 1960s experienced the escalation of the Cold War 
and the threat of mutually assured destruction, and the United States government 
perceived a real and imminent threat to its security. Today, the threat of 
terrorism is perceived as just as real and imminent, if not more so, because that 
threat materialized into an attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. 
113 See infra Part III.C. CSRTs permit the use of hearsay evidence as well 
as evidence obtained by torture or coercion. In addition, CSRTs have upheld 
enemy combatant status designations based upon unsubstantiated anonymous 
allegations. See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38. 
114 Robel, 389 U.S. at 265. 
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the government’s present CSRT system, many of which have been 
suggested by members of Congress and even the Administration.115 
So while the Executive may indeed respond to national 
emergencies using inherent or implied constitutional power or 
authority delegated from Congress, as it did after September 11, 
2001, the Supreme Court has made clear that even national 
emergencies do not provide the government a free pass. 
III. COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS 
Despite their stated purpose, CSRT standards and procedures 
fail to provide a detainee with the opportunity to challenge his 
enemy combatant status designation. Detainees’ slightly expanded 
procedural rights in the form of access to counsel and an expanded 
scope of the record during the D.C. Circuit’s limited review of 
CSRTs—currently “the sole mechanism by which detention may 
be challenged”116—do not remedy the underlying infirmity of the 
CSRT process itself. According to the England Memorandum, 
discussed below, the CSRT process was meant “to determine, in a 
fact-based proceeding, whether the individuals detained . . . [at] 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified as enemy 
combatants and to permit each detainee the opportunity to contest 
such designation.”117 However, the “opportunity” provided “was 
far less than the written procedures appear to require.”118 Because 
CSRTs neither comport with the fundamental elements of due 
process nor sufficiently respect traditional constitutional 
principles, CSRTs fail to protect against arbitrary government 
encroachment on the right to liberty.119 
                                                           
115 See infra Part IV. 
116 Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Senator Arlen Specter in Support 
of Petitioners at 12, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United 
States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Brief of Senator Specter]. 
117 England Memorandum, supra note 34. 
118 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 4. 
119 Brief of Senator Specter, supra note 116, at 13. 
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A.  The Hasty Introduction of CSRTs 
Only one week after the Supreme Court decided in Rasul that 
Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge the legality of their 
detentions in federal court,120 the DOD issued a memorandum 
creating CSRTs and directed the Secretary of the Navy to 
promulgate guidelines for implementation.121 The Secretary of the 
Navy, Gordon England, issued a memorandum on July 29, 2004 
outlining the formation and procedures of CSRTs,122 specifying: 1) 
the basic structure and process of a CSRT; 2) the specific duties 
and qualifications of CSRT participants; and 3) the detainees’ role 
in the CSRT process.123 Though the England Memorandum 
elaborated upon the basic framework provided by the DOD in the 
Wolfowitz Memorandum,124 it failed to provide the procedural 
guarantees that would ensure the legitimacy of the CSRT process 
and preserve traditional American constitutional principles. 
The government has repeatedly justified its CSRT policy as a 
wartime exigency125 despite the policy’s discordance with the 
                                                           
120 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
121 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30. 
122 England Memorandum, supra note 34. The Wolfowitz Memorandum 
that initially established CSRTs designated the Secretary of the Navy as the 
Convening Authority, and directed him to issue implementing guidelines. 
Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30. 
123 See England Memorandum, supra note 34. 
124 Id. 
125 In defending the CSRT system on the Senate floor, Senator Lindsay 
Graham stated that, “to substitute a judge for the military in a time of war to 
determine something as basic as who our enemy is is not only not necessary 
under our Constitution, it impedes the war effort, [and] it is irresponsible.” 152 
CONG. R. S10354 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (Statement of Sen. Graham). 
Similarly, the government has defended the propriety of CSRT procedures on 
the basis that wartime exigencies mandate a system that provides for “the 
detention of the enemy in wartime; the operation of a secure naval facility 
overseas; civilian access to enemy detainees, and the handling of classified 
national security information,” none of which can be satisfied in a traditional 
judicial setting. Corrected Brief for Respondent Addressing Pending Preliminary 
Motions at 26, Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2007) (Nos. 06-
1197, 06-1397). 
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traditional guarantees of due process.126 As the Supreme Court has 
noted, national security is not a catchall justification for any 
government action: 
[T]he concept of “national defense” cannot be deemed an 
end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power 
designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term 
“national defense” is the notion of defending those values 
and ideals which sets this Nation apart . . . . It would indeed 
be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would 
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which 
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.127 
Certainly the government’s objective in defending the nation is 
a legitimate end and should be accorded due weight, but not 
without considering whether the means adopted are both 
appropriate and within the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”128 
Thus, the primary inquiry is whether the CSRT procedures respect 
our own constitutional imperatives. As will be discussed below, 
                                                           
126 Though the government has argued that CSRT procedures are sufficient 
to satisfy constitutional requirements, it has ardently maintained that 
Guantanamo detainees’ non-citizen status precludes them from invoking 
constitutional protections. See Opening Brief for the United States, et al., Al 
Odah v. United States, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2005) (Nos. 05-5064, 
05-5095 through 05-5116). Joseph Marguilies, a Minneapolis civil liberties 
attorney who represented detainees in challenging the government’s detention 
policy in Rasul v. Bush, described the CSRT process as a system that “forces 
an alien prisoner unfamiliar with our justice system and held incommunicado to 
disprove allegations he cannot see, and whose reliability he cannot test, before a 
military panel whose superiors have repeatedly pre-judged the result, all without 
counsel.” JOSEPH MARGUILIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 170 (2006). The government has defended CSRTs as a 
legitimate means by which a prisoner might contest his enemy combatant 
status, but some have accused the government of creating CSRTs solely to give 
the appearance that detainees are not being held at Guantanamo “beyond the 
law.” Id. at 169–70. 
127  United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967). 
128 Chief Justice Marshall famously declared in McCulloch v. Maryland: 
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.” 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). 
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CSRTs fail to meet even this standard.129 
B.  The CSRT Participants and Procedures 
The government depicts CSRTs as non-adversarial proceedings 
wherein neutral panels determine whether detainees already 
classified as enemy combatants actually meet the criteria for such a 
designation, and in which detainees are afforded more than 
sufficient procedural guarantees.130 CSRT procedures as outlined in 
                                                           
129 It is important to make explicit the focus of this inquiry. It is not a 
question of whether the procedures afforded detainees actually satisfy explicitly 
delineated constitutional requirements. Rather, the question is whether the 
procedures afforded the detainees are in line with traditional constitutional 
principles. This is unquestionably a much lower standard. 
130 The government has argued that CSRTs are “virtually identical” to the 
tribunals conducted pursuant to Army Regulation 190-8, which implements 
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, 
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 
(U.S. Dec. 5, 2007); see also Brief for the Boumediene Respondents at 50, 
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 
(U.S. Oct. 9, 2007). In defending CSRTs before the Supreme Court, the 
government noted that, like Army Regulation 190-8, CSRTs are: 
Composed of three commissioned officers plus a non-voting officer who 
serves as a recorder; [CSRT] members are sworn to faithfully and 
impartially execute their duties; The detainee has the right to attend the 
open portions of the proceedings; An interpreter is provided if 
necessary; The detainee has the right to call relevant witnesses if 
reasonably available, question witnesses called by the [CSRT], and 
testify or otherwise address the [CSRT]; The detainee may not be 
forced to testify; The [CSRTs] make decisions by majority vote; The 
decision is made based on a preponderance of the evidence; The 
[CSRTs] create a written report of their decision; and The [CSRT] 
record is reviewed by the Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency. 
Id. at 50–51. In addition, the government argued that in fact CSRTs provide 
more procedural guarantees than Army Regulation 190-8 in that CSRTs provide 
detainees with a Personal Representative, detainees are provided with an 
unclassified summary of the government’s evidence and are permitted to present 
their own documentary evidence, and the Recorder is obligated pursuant to 
CSRT procedures to provide the panel with any relevant potentially exculpatory 
information. Id. at 51–52.  
 While the government is correct to point out the similarities between 
  
690 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the England Memorandum guarantee that detainees are supplied 
interpreters if necessary and that each detainee be appointed a 
Personal Representative to explain the nature of the CSRT and 
assist him in the proceedings.131 Detainees are to be presented with 
an unclassified summary of the charges against them, are permitted 
to testify before the CSRT panel but are not required to do so, and 
are permitted to cross-examine government witnesses or call their 
own, so long as they are “reasonably available.”132 
The reality of CSRT proceedings present a much darker 
picture. Armed guards bring the detainee, shackled at the hands and 
feet, to a small room where he is seated against the wall and chained 
to the floor.133 The detainee sits across from his Personal 
Representative, an interpreter, a paralegal, and the Recorder,134 
whose function is most analogous to that of an “investigator and 
prosecutor, [who] has nearly complete control over the information 
that reaches a CSRT hearing panel.”135 The three members of the 
panel, all commissioned military officers who make the ultimate 
determination as to whether the detainee was properly designated 
as an enemy combatant, sit off to one side of the room.136 
                                                           
CSRTs and the procedures authorized in Army Regulation 190-8 as well as 
those CSRT procedures which, in the government’s view, exceed the guarantees 
afforded in the army regulation, those similarities do not speak to the infirmities 
in the CSRT process. For example, permitting a detainee to call reasonably 
available witnesses is meaningless if the CSRT panel almost always concludes 
that detainees’ witness requests are not reasonably available. See Denbeaux & 
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 31–33. A guarantee that a detainee may question 
witnesses presented against him is meaningful only if government witnesses 
actually appear at his CSRT. It is really no guarantee at all if, as has been 
reported, the government “did not produce any witnesses in any hearing.” Id. at 
2. That CSRTs are required to create a written report of their decisions provides 
only a nominal procedural guarantee if that decision is based upon evidence 
obtained by coercion or anonymous or otherwise unsupported conclusory 
statements. Id. at 33–36. 
131 England Memorandum, supra note 34. 
132 See id. 
133 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 20. 
134  Id. 
135 Respondents’ Joint Opposition Brief, supra note 58, at 4. 
136 Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 30. 
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When gathering evidence to present to the panel, the Recorder 
is directed to examine all “reasonably available” information in the 
government’s possession relevant to a detainee’s enemy combatant 
status designation,137 and at his discretion includes “such evidence  
. . . as may be sufficient to support the detainee’s classification as 
an enemy combatant.”138 He is then charged with compiling an 
unclassified summary that he presents to the CSRT panel for 
review.139 In essence, the Recorder has access to information in the 
                                                           
137 The England Memorandum refers to the entire body of information in 
the government’s possession about a particular detainee as “Government 
Information,” and defines such information as: 
[S]uch reasonably available information in the possession of the U.S. 
Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the 
criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant, including information 
generated in connection with the initial determination to hold the 
detainee as an enemy combatant and in any subsequent reviews of that 
determination, as well as any records, determinations, or reports 
generated in connection with such proceedings. 
England Memorandum, supra note 34, at Enclosure 1. The Recorder is charged 
with reviewing this large body of information, and at his discretion chooses 
what to present to the CSRT panel. Id. 
138 The England Memorandum refers to this smaller subset of information 
as “Government Evidence.” England Memorandum, supra note 34, at Enclosure 
1–2. 
139 Id. at Enclosure 1. The Recorder is also responsible for preparing a 
“record” of the proceedings, which consists of the documentary evidence 
presented to the panel, witness transcripts, any evidence presented by the 
detainee, and “the findings of fact upon which the [panel’s] decision was based.” 
Id. Certainly the Recorder need not include information that is duplicative or 
irrelevant. Of concern is the fact that the Recorder is not required to present to a 
CSRT panel all information in the government’s possession that is relevant to a 
detainee—what the England Memorandum terms “Government Information”—
but rather only information that he deems sufficient to support a detainee’s 
enemy combatant status designation, or “Government Evidence.” See id. 
Moreover, the Recorder has unchecked discretion in his presentation of 
exculpatory evidence, if there is any. Thus, there is a real possibility that the 
government could possess relevant information, some of which might be 
exculpatory, that the Recorder is not required to present to the panel.  
 The scope of the record is also implicated if a detainee petitions the D.C. 
Circuit for a review of his CSRT, pursuant to his right to do so under the DTA. 
Until recently the D.C. Circuit Court was only permitted to review the record 
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government’s possession about a particular detainee that is not 
necessarily presented to the panel. Perhaps more importantly, 
CSRT regulations direct the Recorder to present to the panel any 
potentially exculpatory evidence, but the Recorder’s decisions are 
neither reviewed nor checked by any process to confirm that the 
panel was given all relevant information.140 
 As for the Personal Representative, while he is authorized to 
“assist” the detainee, the England Memorandum makes clear that 
this officer acts neither as a lawyer nor as an advocate.141 In fact, a 
Personal Representative does little more than explain the process 
to the detainee in meetings that are often brief and rarely take place 
more than once.142 The other so-called “guarantees” outlined in the 
                                                           
presented to the CSRT panel, but the scope of the record on review in the D.C. 
Circuit is now being challenged. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), reh’g en banc denied, Bismullah III, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
petition for cert. filed, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07A-677 (U.S. 2008). Though 
the D.C. Circuit Court recently agreed with detainees that it should be privy to 
the entire body of information in the government’s possession relevant to a 
detainee when reviewing a CSRT, see Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178, in February 
2008 the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s order, or in the alternative for the Supreme Court to examine the 
scope of review on the merits. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 33, Gates v. 
Bismullah, No. 07-1054 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2008). 
140 Petitioners’ Joint Brief in Support of Pending Motions to Set 
Procedures and for Entry of Protective Order at 7, Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 
(D.C. Cir. March 26, 2007) (Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397). 
141 Id. The England Memorandum directs the Personal Representative to 
state the following at each initial meeting with a detainee:  
I am neither your lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the 
responsibility of assisting your preparation for the hearing. None of the 
information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be 
obligated to divulge it at the hearing. I am available to assist you in 
preparing an oral or written presentation to the [panel] should you 
desire to do so.  
Id. 
142 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 14. Mark Denbeaux, a 
professor at Seton Hall University School of Law and counsel to two detainees 
held at Guantanamo, undertook an analysis of CSRT proceedings at 
Guantanamo. His study compared “the hearing process that the detainees were 
promised with the process actually provided.” Id. at 4. The results of the study 
are based on records from 393 of the 558 detainees for whom CSRTs were 
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England Memorandum similarly fall far short of the minimal 
procedural safeguards that would be necessary to ensure both the 
legitimacy of the CSRT system and adherence to our overarching 
constitutional system. 
C.  CSRTs Do Not Provide Adequate Procedural Safeguards 
Although the fundamental right to liberty exists regardless of 
one’s citizenship, such a right is meaningless without adequate 
protective measures, which lie in procedural due process guarantees 
and judicial review. Indeed, the Framers saw the judiciary as the 
protector of fundamental rights. Thomas Jefferson expressed his 
understanding that the Bill of Rights would be “the legal check [on 
the threat to rights] which it puts into the hands of the 
judiciary.”143 James Madison expressed his understanding of the 
courts as “the guardians of those rights.”144 The CSRT process 
does not begin to provide even minimal procedural guarantees to 
ensure that the government does not use its congressionally 
recognized power to detain enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
arbitrarily. Thus the legitimacy of the detentions as well as our 
commitment to the natural law principles underlying the 
Constitution are severely undermined. 
Although the government has strenuously argued that the 
                                                           
conducted. Of those 393 detainees, only 102 full CSRT records are available. Id. 
In addition to the 102 full CSRT records, Professor Denbeaux reviewed 356 
“transcripts”—summarized detainee statements—that were released by the DOD 
as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit initiated by the Associated 
Press. Id. at 7. After comparing the transcripts with the full CSRT records, the 
study concluded that of the 558 detainees for whom CSRTs were conducted, 
202 detainees chose not to participate in the process; of the 102 full hearing 
records available, forty-three of them represent CSRTs where the detainee was 
not physically present. Id. at 8. 
143 McAffee, supra note 69, at 1522 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 620 (1971)). 
144 Id. at 1523 (quoting Madison’s statement of June 8, 1789, in 
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS 83–84 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowing, & Charlene 
Bangs Bickford eds., 1991)). 
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procedures afforded detainees need not satisfy constitutional 
requirements because detainees held at Guantanamo do not have 
constitutional rights,145 this argument ignores the values and 
principles underlying the Constitution—values which are 
“essential components of the rule of law.”146 Even if the 
Constitution does not apply to detainees per se, those principles 
underlying the Constitution are still applicable and thus mandate 
that we provide, at a minimum, procedural guarantees that conform 
with the American notion of due process. In order to “ensure that 
the rule of law prevails at Guantanamo,”147 detainees must be 
afforded a system of adequate substantive and procedural 
safeguards to ensure that long-held constitutional principles are not 
compromised.148 
                                                           
145 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Both the government 
and the D.C. Circuit Court have relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager to deny detainees at Guantanamo constitutional rights. 
Johnson examined the rights of a group of German nationals captured by 
American forces in China during World War II who were tried and convicted by 
a military commission sitting in China, and subsequently sent to Germany to 
serve out their sentences. Id. at 765–66. In holding that nonresident enemy 
aliens captured and detained abroad have no right to petition a United States 
court for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court explained that non-resident 
aliens have historically only been permitted access to United States courts if 
they could demonstrate some arguable presence within the United States. Id. at 
776–78. In contrast, the German detainees in this case “at no relevant time were 
within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of 
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.” Id. at 777. In denying 
Guantanamo detainees the right to seek writs of habeas corpus, both the 
government and the courts have borrowed the rationale from Johnson, explaining 
that because Guantanamo detainees are non-resident aliens captured abroad and 
detained in Cuba, Johnson precludes any constitutional right to habeas corpus. 
See Opening Brief for the United States at 15, Al-Odah v. United States, 476 
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2007) (Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116); 
see also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002). This reasoning 
has been widely criticized, and even the Supreme Court called such a 
comparison into question in Rasul. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476–78 
(2004). 
146 Brief of Specialists in Israeli Military Law, supra note 14, at 4. 
147 Brief of Senator Specter, supra note 116, at 4. 
148 That is not to say that non-citizen prisoners captured and detained 
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The traditional understanding of due process—fundamental to 
an adversarial system149—is inextricably linked with “the right to 
present a defense (including the right to testify and to call 
witnesses); . . . representation by counsel . . . and the right to 
confront and cross-examine.”150 But because CSRTs are explicitly 
non-adversarial,151 they cannot provide detainees with that 
opportunity. Technically, the England Memorandum sets out 
provisions to allow detainees the opportunity to “participate” in 
the CSRT process by giving them: 
[T]he assistance of a Personal Representative; an 
interpreter if necessary; an opportunity to review 
unclassified information; the opportunity to appear 
personally to present reasonably available information 
relevant to [his classification] as an enemy combatant; the 
opportunity to question witnesses . . . ; and, to the extent 
                                                           
abroad must necessarily be able to invoke all potential procedural safeguards 
existing within the broadest application of constitutional due process. Such an 
argument has been widely criticized for its incompatibility with the Executive’s 
constitutional war powers and because of the far-reaching ramifications of extra-
territorial application of constitutional rights. See Tung Yin, Procedural Due 
Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 
TENN. L. REV. 351, 366, 373–75 (2006). See also Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784 
(“If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world . . . [s]uch a 
construction would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy 
elements, guerrilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’ could require the American 
Judiciary to assure them [constitutional protections] . . . . No decision of this 
court suggests such a view.”). This Note asserts that one of the “primary 
purposes” of the Due Process Clause—to protect the natural right to liberty 
against arbitrary encroachment by the government—is instructive in determining 
what procedures should be afforded to Guantanamo detainees. An examination of 
the ramifications of extra-territorial application of all constitutional rights is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
149 The term “adversarial system” is a legal term of art that refers to “a 
procedural system, such as the Anglo-American legal system, involving active 
and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before an 
independent decision-maker.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (8th ed. 2004). 
150 Yin, supra note 148, at 401 (internal citations omitted). 
151 England Memorandum, supra note 34. “Non-adversarial” as used here 
is a legal term of art that contrasts the traditional American adversary system. 
See supra note 149. 
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they are reasonably available, the opportunity to call 
witnesses on his behalf.152 
Despite the supposed procedures afforded detainees in the 
England Memorandum’s implementing guidelines, detainees’ 
requests to see government evidence, witnesses, or even testimony 
from other detainees at Guantanamo have almost always been 
denied.153 These guarantees, therefore, are illusory at best. Written 
accounts and studies of CSRTs demonstrate the extent to which 
their procedures undermine traditional constitutional protections of 
liberty and demonstrate a prisoner’s total inability to mount any 
kind of meaningful defense.154 
i. The Government’s Evidence 
CSRT guidelines do not require the government to conform to 
traditional rules of evidence, but rather permit the panel to consider 
hearsay and evidence possibly obtained through torture or 
coercion.155 Such a departure from traditional evidentiary 
                                                           
152 England Memorandum, supra note 34.  
153 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 30. CSRT panels are only 
required to honor detainees’ requests for witnesses and evidence if they are 
“reasonably available,” though CSRT procedures fail to define this term. Thus, 
to deny a detainee’s request, the government need only maintain that the 
evidence or witness requested by the detainee was not reasonably available. Id. It 
should be noted that although requests for testimony from other detainees were 
sometimes granted, the extent to which such testimony might help exonerate a 
detainee is questionable, given that such testimony is delivered by a presumed 
enemy combatant in favor of another presumed enemy combatant. Id. at 5. 
154 See generally id. (concluding that CSRTs are an attempt by the 
government to “replace habeas corpus with this no hearing process”); see also 
MARGUILIES, supra note 126. Indeed, several detainees have been subject to 
second hearings after initially being found not to be enemy combatants, and “at 
least one detainee, after his first and second [CSRTs] unanimously determined 
him to not be an enemy combatant, had yet a third [CSRT] . . . which finally 
found him to be properly classified as an enemy combatant.” Denbeaux & 
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 37. Such re-hearings are conducted in abstentia, 
and a detainee is not informed that his first CSRT determined he was not an 
enemy combatant. Id. at 37–39. 
155 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 35–36; see also MARGUILIES, 
supra note 126, at 164. The government has maintained that although CSRT 
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standards, in conjunction with inconsistent adherence to other 
evidentiary rules governing the CSRTs, makes reliability 
uncertain.156 For example, CSRT panels have been known to rely 
                                                           
procedures permit the panels to consider hearsay evidence or that obtained 
through torture or coercion, those procedures also “require [panels] to reject 
unreliable evidence based on any concerns regarding coercion that may have 
arisen in the proceedings before them.” Brief for the Respondents at 58, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States, 06-1196 (U.S. Oct. 
9, 2007). However, whether or not CSRT panel members are aware that the 
evidence before them may have been obtained through torture or coercion such 
that they might have concerns about its reliability is unclear. The government 
punted as to whether the rules permitting questionable evidence might lead to a 
determination based on coerced testimony in the case of a specific detainee, 
stating, “[t]o the extent the rules are deemed insufficient in any concrete 
situation to ensure that determinations are not based on coerced testimony, the 
District of Columbia Circuit can say so on DTA review in a case that actually 
presents such an issue.” Id. at 58. CSRT panels have affirmed a detainee’s 
enemy combatant status only on the basis of anonymous allegations, without 
any actual evidence. In the case of Murat Kernaz, a German Muslim of Turkish 
descent, a CSRT credited a “single, unsigned document authored by an 
unnamed military official who wrote, without supporting evidence, that Kurnaz 
was a member of al-Qaeda” despite overwhelming and credible evidence to the 
contrary. Id. at 165–66. 
156 In 2006, The National Journal reviewed the government’s files on 132 
Guantanamo detainees, as well as largely redacted transcripts of the CSRTs for 
314 detainees, and concluded that “much of the evidence—even the classified 
evidence—gathered by the Defense Department against [the detainees] is flimsy, 
second-, third-, fourth- or 12th-hand. It’s based largely on admissions by the 
detainees themselves or on coerced, or worse, interrogations of their fellow 
inmates, some of whom have been proved to be liars.” Corine Hegland, Empty 
Evidence, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006. Indeed, the review found that one particular 
Guantanamo detainee made accusations against more than 60 other detainees—
“more than 10 percent of Guantanamo’s entire prison population”—placing 
many of them at a jihadist training camp. Id. After Syrian detainee Mohammed 
al-Tumani’s protestations that he was not at the training camp were bolstered, 
perhaps uncharacteristically, by his Personal Representative who took the time 
to examine the classified evidence, it was discovered that the aforementioned 
accuser “had placed Tumani [at the training camp] three months before the 
teenager had even entered Afghanistan.” Id. His curiosity piqued, the Personal 
Representative looked into the other detainees the accuser had fingered, and 
discovered that “[n]one of the men had been in Afghanistan at the time the 
accuser said he saw them at the camp.” Id. Despite the seemingly blatant 
unreliability of this evidence, Tumani’s CSRT nonetheless declared him an 
  
698 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
on evidence that a prisoner owns a particular kind of cheap, 
common Casio watch as proof that the detainee has or knows how 
to make explosives.157 Similarly, one CSRT panel relied on a 
detainee’s sarcastic remarks as true admissions of his involvement 
with terrorism.158 
Of all the information the Recorder may collect about a detainee 
and which may ultimately be presented to a CSRT panel, CSRT 
guidelines permit a detainee access only to unclassified evidence.159 
Though this may certainly seem legitimate given the government’s 
national security concerns, because most evidence and other 
relevant information presented against a detainee at a CSRT is 
classified, practical application means detainees often have no 
opportunity to see or rebut any of the evidence presented against 
them.160 In fact, in 52% of CSRT proceedings, the government did 
                                                           
enemy combatant. Id. 
157 The government has used ownership of a Casio watch, one model of 
which has a circuit board that al Qaeda has used for making bombs, as evidence 
against at least ten detainees held at Guantanamo. Hegland, supra note 156, at 
165; see also MARGUILIES, supra note 126. 
158 During one detainee’s CSRT, he was reported to have said, “I saw bin 
Laden five times: Three times on Al Jazeera and twice on Yemeni news.” 
MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 165. This statement was characterized in the 
detainee’s file as an admission to knowing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, after 
another detainee sarcastically yelled “Fine, you got me; I’m a terrorist,” the 
CSRT panel recorded this statement as an admission despite the fact that the 
interrogators recognized it as sarcasm. Id. These statements should have been 
accurately conveyed in the detainees’ files, allowing the CSRT panels to make a 
more informed assessment. Because this “evidence” was misrepresented, the 
panel’s ultimate determination must be called into question. 
159 See England Memorandum, supra note 34, at 7. Unclassified evidence 
includes documents from family and friends and publicly available documents 
released by the government or published by the press. See Denbeaux & 
Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 24–29. Technically, unclassified evidence also 
includes internal government documents labeled “For Official Use Only.”Id. 
The extent to which these documents are relied upon is unclear, and independent 
studies have charged that the government treats these official documents as 
classified despite their unclassified status. Id.  
160 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 25 (“In essence detainees 
were not shown any evidence against them, classified or unclassified. Not only 
was [certain unclassified but “For Official Use Only”] evidence withheld from 
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not present any unclassified evidence in its cases against detainees 
but rather relied “solely on the presumptively valid classified 
information to meet its burden of proof.”161 Moreover, an 
astounding 89% of detainees were not provided any facts or 
evidence, unclassified or otherwise.162 These statistics illustrate 
that detainees have virtually no access to the vast majority of 
documents and information in the government’s possession. 
Finally, CSRT determinations often rest upon classified 
evidence, which is presumed to be reliable and to which detainees 
have no access.163 CSRTs operate under a rebuttable presumption 
in favor of the government’s evidence.164 Rebuttable presumptions 
are certainly not novel; indeed, courts often use them when direct 
proof is impractical or difficult to obtain.165 However, because 
                                                           
the detainee in violation of the CSRT procedures, but other declassified evidence 
was also withheld.”). 
161 Id. at 22 (“A review of the 361 [available CSRT] transcripts reveals that 
the Government may have shown the detainee some evidence before he began his 
statement in 4% of the cases. When the hearing began, 89% of the detainees had 
no facts to rebut whether from witnesses or from documentary evidence. The 
same documents reveal that the [CSRT panel] showed the detainee unclassified 
information in only 7% of the hearings. It is unclear why the [CSRT panel] 
showed unclassified evidence in some cases but not others.”). 
162 Id. at 22, 31. 
163 For example, the records for detainee ISN #1463 include the detainee’s 
statement that, “[T]here is no attorney here today and I don’t know anything 
about the law . . . I cannot say anything that [might] be used against me. I am 
even afraid to say what my name is.” MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 163. 
During the CSRT proceeding for Mustafa Ait Idir, a Bosnian-Algerian, the 
CSRT panel questioned him about charges that he associated with an Al Qaeda 
operative and planned to attack the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. When Idir asked 
for the name of the al Qaeda operative with whom he had allegedly associated, 
the CSRT panel refused, saying it did not know the name of the operative. Idir 
responded, “How can I respond to this? . . . If you tell me the name then I can 
respond and defend myself against this accusation.” The CSRT panel either 
refused or was unable to give him any information, rendering it impossible for 
Idir to rebut or contest the accusation. See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 
38, at 16–17. 
164 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 19; see also, England 
Memorandum, supra note 34. 
165 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247–50 (1988), 
accord, D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 541–42 (1977). 
  
700 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
CSRT panels may consider evidence that is never shared with 
detainees, it is virtually impossible for a detainee to disprove any 
evidence supporting the determination that he is an enemy 
combatant.166 
ii. The Detainees’ Evidence 
While CSRT guidelines technically permit a detainee to request 
his own exculpatory evidence, those same guidelines also allow the 
government to deny a detainee’s request for evidence if it is 
irrelevant or if it is not “reasonably available.”167 Such standards 
are easily manipulated by the government—CSRTs often fail to 
provide any reason at all for denying evidence requests168 even 
when the outside evidence could in fact contribute greatly to the 
CSRT process. For example, prior to the CSRT for Mustafa Ait 
Idir, a Bosnian-Algerian apprehended in Bosnia and accused of 
associating with an al Qaeda operative and planning an attack on 
the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, the detainee requested official court 
documents from Bosnia which he asserted would have proved that 
he had already been cleared of terrorism charges; the government 
                                                           
166 Because the evidence before a CSRT is almost always classified and the 
detainee is not permitted access to it, he is “unable to challenge, explain, or 
simply rebut it. The rebuttable presumption of validity becomes, in practice, an 
irrebutable one.” Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 19. For example, 
during the CSRT for detainee ISN # 1463, who was only provided an 
unclassified summary of evidence, the detainee said in response to the 
allegations against him, “That is not true. I did not help anybody and whoever 
is saying that I did, let them present their evidence . . . . It’s not fair for me if 
you mask some of the secret information . . . . How can I defend myself?” Id. at 
21. 
167 England Memorandum, supra note 34, at 4. 
168 Detainees ISN #333, ISN #680, and ISN #928 all identified specific 
documents or evidence during their CSRTs that they said would exonerate 
them, including passports and visas. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 
32–33. In each of their cases, the government failed to procure the identified 
evidence after designating the information as not “reasonably available.” Id. 
Consequently, each detainee’s enemy combatant status designation was affirmed. 
Id. 
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refused to grant Idir’s request.169 Although the Bosnian government 
had already investigated Idir and cleared him of terrorism 
charges,170 and though Idir’s CSRT panel consulted other legal 
documents from Bosnia, the panel determined that the specific 
records sought by Idir were not “reasonably available.”171 
iii. Witnesses 
CSRT guidelines technically give detainees the right to cross-
examine the government’s witnesses and to call their own 
witnesses.172 These rights are only meaningful, however, if the 
government’s witnesses are actually present at a CSRT and if 
detainees’ requests for witnesses are honored. For 393 out of the 
558 detainees for whom CSRTs were reportedly conducted at 
Guantanamo—and the only CSRTs for which records have actually 
been released—the government did not produce a single witness.173 
Furthermore, a detainee’s right to call his own witnesses is 
severely limited in practice. Because detainees are completely 
isolated from the outside world, unable to communicate with 
family, and have only limited communication with counsel,174 it is 
unclear how a prisoner detained at Guantanamo could practically 
                                                           
169 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 33. See also MARGUILIES, 
supra note 126, at 164. 
170 MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 164. 
171 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 33. Other records that CSRTs 
have determined to be not “reasonably available” include such things as medical 
records from a hospital in Jordan and testimony from explicitly identified family 
members even though their names, phone numbers and addresses had been 
provided by the detainee. Id. at 32. The government is not required to explain 
why certain evidence is not reasonably available; a conclusory statement that the 
evidence is not reasonably available is a sufficient justification. See generally 
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38. 
172 England Memorandum, supra note 34. 
173 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 21. In these cases, CSRTs 
relied on classified information. 
174 Detainees are not represented by counsel for purposes of their CSRTs, 
though detainees may be represented by counsel, often on a pro bono basis, for 
purposes of D.C. Circuit review of their CSRTs. 
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locate any witnesses to testify on his behalf.175 In reality, a 
detainee’s potential pool of witnesses is limited to other alleged 
terrorists similarly detained at Guantanamo. This subset of 
witnesses, as well as any proposed witness for the detainee, is 
further limited by the CSRT panel’s discretion to decide whether 
the witness is “reasonably available.” Unsurprisingly, the panels 
do not often honor witness requests.176 Therefore, while detainees’ 
requests for testimony from other detainees at Guantanamo were 
granted approximately 50% of the time, requests for testimony of 
witnesses located outside Guantanamo were uniformly denied.177 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS 
The continuing disagreement among the Supreme Court, 
Congress and the Administration over detainees’ rights has resulted 
in a six-year struggle between the three branches and has seriously 
undermined the credibility of the American constitutional 
system.178 The good news, albeit minor, is that recent 
                                                           
175 MARGUILIES, supra note 126, at 167. 
176 Id. 
177 Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 28–29. Requests for witnesses 
located outside Guantanamo were denied if not reasonably available or 
“irrelevant.” Practical and security considerations regarding the transport of 
civilians to Guantanamo to testify at a CSRT could also deem a requested 
witness “not reasonably available.” In one case, a CSRT panel denied a 
detainee’s request for witnesses because the panel determined that it “would 
have been burdened with repetitive, cumulative testimony” by witnesses who 
would have testified similarly that the detainee was not an enemy combatant. 
Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38, at 28. However, CSRT guidelines do 
not include a provision for denying witness requests on this basis. 
178 Members of Congress and the Administration have directly contributed 
to the perpetuation of the struggle over detainees’ rights—had they simply 
afforded detainees basic procedural guarantees during the CSRT process to allow 
for a meaningful review and the potential for release, it is at least arguable that 
detainees’ need to challenge the legality of their detentions in federal court 
would have been sharply diminished. Further, it is perhaps even likely that 
federal courts at the various stages of the review process might have looked upon 
detainees’ petitions with less scrutiny had they been afforded minimal procedural 
guarantees in the beginning. 
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developments in the three branches signal the government’s 
recognition of the need to modify the procedures provided to the 
Guantanamo detainees.179 Certainly any revised procedures must 
allow for legitimate defense of national security interests, but the 
most effective procedures will do so without compromising core 
constitutional principles. Affording detainees a process that 
comports with fundamental constitutional values, while recognizing 
the need to tailor the system to take account of particular 
exigencies presented by the War on Terror, will strengthen the 
United States’ security interest by maintaining the credibility of 
the American constitutional system and preserving the core 
principles upon which the United States was founded. 
A.  The Administration 
Though the Administration has consistently defended CSRTs 
as an effective process for reviewing detainees’ enemy combatant 
status,180 roughly one quarter of detainees cleared by the system 
                                                           
179 For example, in July 2007 the D.C. Circuit Court ruled to expand the 
record on review in an action brought under the DTA—a ruling that the 
government is now attempting to challenge in the Supreme Court. See 
Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Although the government has 
challenged the D.C. Circuit’s order to produce an expanded—and more 
complete—record during the review of a detainee’s CSRT, various officials from 
within the Administration, including some members of the military involved in 
the CSRT process, have acknowledged the need to reexamine the procedures 
afforded detainees. Commander Jeffrey Gordon of the Navy, a Pentagon 
spokesman, said in October 2007 that while no decisions had yet been made to 
“redo” any CSRTs, “discussions on a wide variety of detainee procedures 
continue within interagency circles.” William Glaberson, U.S. Mulls New 
Status Hearings for Guantanamo Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A16. 
All the while, members of Congress have attempted to undo the damaging 
legislation passed in previous Congresses—numerous bills have been introduced 
that would repeal the court-stripping provisions passed in 2005 and 2006 and 
restore habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees. See infra note 243 and 
accompanying text. 
180 The government has contended that detainees, “enjoy more procedural 
protections than any other captured enemy combatants in the history of warfare.” 
Brief for the Boumediene Respondents, supra note 130, at 9.  
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remain in custody at Guantanamo.181 The military has suggested 
that the failure to release some cleared detainees lies in the refusal 
of the detainees’ home countries to accept them back or guarantee 
that they will not be tortured or mistreated upon their return.182 
However, military officials have also acknowledged that the 
Pentagon retains the ultimate authority to continue holding a 
detainee regardless of a CSRT determination that a detainee should 
be released from custody.183 In practice, this means that the 
Pentagon may order new CSRTs for detainees who are initially 
recommended for release, thereby allowing the government to 
continue holding detainees at Guantanamo.184 The Pentagon’s 
authority to continue detainment despite a CSRT determination in 
favor of release questions the legitimacy of the entire CSRT 
process.185 
i. Military Officials Condemn the CSRT Process 
Sworn statements by two military officials involved in CSRTs 
further reinforce the conclusion that the process is fatally 
flawed.186 Both officers have filed declarations in federal court to 
                                                           
181 “At least eight prisoners at Guantanamo are there even though they are 
no longer designated as enemy combatants.” Hegland, supra note 156. See also 
Farah Stockman, Some Cleared Guantanamo Inmates Stay in Custody—
Lawyers call U.S. System of Hearings a Sham, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 
2007, at 1A. 
182 Id. In regard to the transfer of detainees to their home countries, a 
Pentagon spokesman said, “many countries are just not moving very quickly.” 
William Glaberson, Hurdles Frustrate Effort to Shrink Guantanamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at A1. 
183 Stockman, supra note 181. In addition to determinations made at 
Guantanamo, case-by-case reviews are also conducted in Washington. In 
determining whether to authorize release of a detainee, officials consider factors 
such as new evidence, any danger potentially posed by a detainee, and the 
willingness of a detainee’s home country to ensure that he will not pose a threat 
to the United States in the future. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Mark Jacobson, an assistant for detainee policy under Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld from November 2002 through August 2003, said in 
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support detainees’ contentions that the CSRT process is unfair and 
inadequate.187 One statement, filed in the Supreme Court by Army 
Reserve Lt. Col. Stephen A. Abraham,188 was so revealing and 
critical of CSRTs that some believe it contributed to the Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in Boumediene v. Bush.189 
Similarly, statements by an unnamed Army Reserve Major190 
collected during an investigation by the Oregon Federal Public 
Defender’s Office in the case of a Sudanese national detained at 
                                                           
an interview with The National Journal, “I think the standards for sending 
someone to Guantanamo in 2002 and early 2003 were not as high as they 
should have been.” Hegland, supra note 156; see also Lyle Denniston, A New 
Critique of Pentagon Detainee Panels, SCOTUSblog.com, Oct. 5, 2007, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/a-new-critique-of-pentagon-
detainee-panels/ [hereinafter A New Critique]. 
187 See Lyle Denniston, Abraham Takes on Top Security Echelon, 
SCOTUSblog.com, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/ 
uncategorized/abraham-takes-on-top-security-echelon/ [hereinafter Abraham Takes 
on Top Security Echelon]; see also A New Critique, supra note 186. 
188 Lt. Col. Abraham, a California attorney at the law firm of Fink & 
Abraham and a Reservist in the United States Army, was assigned to the Office 
for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants 
(“OARDEC”) in September 2004. Declaration of Reserve Lt. Col. Stephen A. 
Abraham at 2, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 
2007/11/sub-new-abraham-declaration.pdf [hereinafter Abraham Declaration]. 
OARDEC was charged with testing “the validity of prior summary 
pronouncements that the detainees at Guantanamo had been properly classified as 
Enemy Combatants. OARDEC rules authorized the collection of relevant 
information prior to the empanelling of a [CSRT].” Id. 
189 See A New Critique, supra note 186. In a second statement filed in the 
D.C. Circuit Court in another detainee case, Hamad v. Gates, No. 07-1098 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), Lt. Col. Abraham charged that, “there was no systematic 
method for requesting the government information relating to specific detainees” 
and that, “the individuals collecting, reviewing, and processing the information 
to be used by the [CSRTs] appeared to have little experience with intelligence 
products.” Abraham Declaration, supra note 188. 
190 The officer’s name was redacted from the publicly available declaration 
and withheld from reports. According to his sworn declaration, he sat on forty- 
nine CSRT panels in Guantanamo. Declaration of William J. Teesdale, Esq., 
Hamad v. Bush, No. 05-1009 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Teesdale 
Declaration]. 
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Guantanamo also provided sharp criticism of the process.191 In his 
declaration, the anonymous military official stated that he 
witnessed several major problems involving evidence and 
procedure.192 First, no exculpatory evidence was ever formally 
presented in any CSRT he attended, although he did acknowledge 
that panels sometimes inadvertently discovered exculpatory 
evidence as a result of investigating inconsistencies in the record.193 
Second, the role and responsibilities of the Recorder seemed to 
differ in each hearing.194 Third, he witnessed officers involved in 
the proceedings express legitimate concern that CSRT panel 
members “did not understand the distinction between conclusory 
statements and actual evidence.”195 Moreover, he stated that in six 
of the forty-nine CSRT hearings in which he participated, the panel 
came to a unanimous decision that the detainee was not an enemy 
combatant, but he observed that in each case, the Pentagon directed 
that a new CSRT panel be convened.196 
ii. Political Influences on the CSRT Process 
The government’s CSRT policy has not been untouched by 
politics. Documents released by the Pentagon in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act request197 reveal that CSRTs have 
resulted in “inconsistent decisions to release men declared by the 
Bush administration to be among America’s most-hardened 
enemies . . . rais[ing] questions about whether [the decisions] were 
arbitrary.”198 The October 2007 resignation of the lead prosecutor 
for terrorism trials at Guantanamo, Air Force Col. Morris Davis, 
                                                           
191 See A New Critique, supra note 186. 
192 See generally Teesdale Declaration, supra note 190. 
193 Id. at 6. 
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197 The Freedom of Information Act request was initiated by the Associated 
Press. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 38. 
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also illustrates the force of politics. Col. Davis resigned after he 
charged that, “politically motivated officials at the Pentagon 
pushed for [the] conviction of high-profile detainees [in formal 
military commissions] before the 2008 election.”199 In discussing 
his abrupt resignation, Col. Davis cited his concerns about the use 
of classified evidence in CSRTs and the propensity of supposedly 
neutral legal advisors to interfere with prosecutorial functions.200 
iii. The Administration’s Suggested Alternatives 
Aware of the criticisms of and challenges to the CSRT system, 
the Administration recently indicated that it is considering 
alternatives.201 One of the options being contemplated would allow 
the government to convene new CSRTs for detainees currently 
remaining at Guantanamo.202 Another alternative proposed by the 
White House would involve granting detainees “substantially 
greater rights [than they currently have] as part of an effort to close 
the detention center” and relocate detainees to prisons in the 
United States.203 This may involve providing detainees counsel and 
giving final status determination authority to federal judges rather 
than military officers.204 Though certainly an improvement on the 
current process, these proposed alternatives are not an 
acknowledgement by the current Administration that the current 
CSRT procedures are flawed. Rather, the Administration maintains 
that they are only an attempt to assess the practicality of closing 
the detention center at Guantanamo.205 
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B.  The Courts 
i. Bismullah v. Gates and the Fight Over the Scope of the        
Record on Review 
Petitioners in Bismullah were detained at Guantanamo, 
designated by separate CSRTs as enemy combatants, and 
subsequently filed petitions for review of their enemy combatant 
status designations in the D.C. Circuit.206 During review before the 
D.C. Circuit, the parties disagreed over the breadth of the 
protective order originally issued in 2005 that dictated the scope of 
the record on review as well as how to handle sensitive information 
and interaction between detainees and their counsel.207 The 
government argued that the record before the D.C. Circuit when 
conducting its review of a CSRT should be limited to that compiled 
by the Recorder, and that the government should only be required 
to turn over to petitioners’ counsel the information presented to 
                                                           
206 Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Bismullah v. Gates was 
consolidated from two separate cases—Bismullah v. Gates and Parhat v. Gates. 
Petitioner Bismullah was captured in Afghanistan in 2003 and determined by a 
CSRT to be an enemy combatant on November 30, 2004. The seven petitioners 
in Parhat were captured in Pakistan in December 2001 and each was determined 
by a separate CSRT to be an enemy combatant. Because both cases were filed 
under the DTA and ostensibly dealt with the same issue, the D.C. Circuit 
ordered them to be argued on the same day and consolidated both cases. 
207 The Green Protective Order governed a detainee’s access to counsel and 
information from 2004 until it was challenged in Bismullah I. See supra notes 
41, 45. The old protective order provided some protections for letters written 
between counsel and a detainee that were related to counsel’s representation of 
the detainee, as well as protections for privileged documents and publicly-filed 
legal documents relating to that representation; a presumption that detainees’ 
counsel have a “need to know” information in their own cases and in related 
cases; and revised procedures for in-person counsel visits at Guantanamo. See In 
re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004). Though 
the Green Protective Order provided some guarantees for detainees, it was 
severely limited in scope and significantly impaired the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
ability to conduct any kind of meaningful review. See Bismullah I, 501 F.3d 
178. 
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the CSRT.208 By contrast, petitioners argued that the reviewing 
court should have access to all evidence and information 
“reasonably available to the government,” including information 
that may have not been presented to the CSRT panel.209 
The D.C. Circuit Court agreed with detainees that the record on 
review should consist of the entire body of information collected 
by the government and not merely that which was compiled by the 
Recorder and presented to the CSRT panel.210 The court explained 
that such a limitation on courts’ access to evidence would severely 
inhibit meaningful judicial review, and the court subsequently 
ordered the government to turn over the relevant documents.211 
The government did not readily acquiesce to the court’s order. 
Rather than turn over the entire body of information relevant to 
each detainee, the government requested a panel rehearing, arguing 
that it could not meet the burden of production imposed by the 
court’s decision.212 While the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately denied 
the government’s petition for a panel rehearing, it expressly 
presented the government with the option of convening new 
CSRTs rather than attempting to compile all of the relevant 
information in the government’s possession at the time of each 
detainee’s original CSRT.213 While this alternative would still 
require the government to compile information regarding a detainee, 
DOD regulations only require the compilation of information that 
is reasonably available at the time the CSRT is convened.214 The 
government argued that this standard still imposed too heavy a 
burden and petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc. The court, 
in an even 5-5 split, denied the government’s motion on February 
1, 2008.215 
Not yet willing to concede, the government asked the D.C. 
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Circuit Court to stay its July 2007 order, applicable not only to 
the petitioners in Bismullah I but to all the 180 detainee petitions 
now pending before it, thus giving the government time to challenge 
that decision in the Supreme Court.216 The Circuit Court duly 
granted the stay—though it applied only to the petitioners in 
Bismullah I—and on February 14, 2007 the government petitioned 
the Supreme Court to hold the case until after its disposition of 
another detainee case already pending there, or in the alternative, to 
grant review and set it on an expedited schedule so that it may be 
decided this term.217 In its petition to the Supreme Court, the 
government argued that the Circuit Court’s July 2007 order 
expanding the scope of the record on review is “unprecedented in 
any administrative or judicial context” and would require the 
government “to divert a significant portion of its intelligence, law 
enforcement, and military resources to either creating new ‘records’ 
for DTA litigation or to conducting entirely new CSRT hearings for 
those detainees.”218 Detainees’ reply brief urged the court to deny 
the government’s appeal, but agreed that, should the Court decide 
to hear the case, it should do so on an expedited schedule.219 
Though the Supreme Court was expected to consider the appeal at 
its private conference on March 14, 2008,220 no action has yet been 
taken. 
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ii. Boumediene v. Bush, Al-Odah v. United States and the Fight 
Over the Constitutionality of Court-Stripping 
While the parties in Bismullah continue to disagree over the 
scope of the D.C. Circuit’s review of CSRT procedures under the 
DTA and MCA, petitioners in the companion cases Boumediene v. 
Bush and Al-Odah v. United States are awaiting the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in their own action, wherein they challenged the 
constitutionality of the court-stripping provision itself.221 After 
the D.C. Circuit Court ordered that petitioner detainees’ habeas 
petitions be dismissed in February 2007,222 they filed petitions for 
writs of certiorari in the Supreme Court.223 The Supreme Court 
initially denied petitioners’ request,224 but in a rare and unexpected 
move, the Court reversed itself on the last day of the term several 
months later and granted detainees’ petition for certiorari and 
rehearing.225 
After years of navigating the federal appellate court system,226 
                                                           
221 Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195; Al-Odah v. United States (U.S. 
argued Dec. 5, 2007). 
222 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C. 
Circuit agreed that detainees had no independent right to seek writs of habeas 
corpus in federal court under the MCA; rather, the court held detainees have only 
the right to a review of their CSRT determinations pursuant to the DTA. See 
generally id. Judge Rogers dissented from the majority opinion and maintained 
that the court-stripping provision of the MCA is an unconstitutional suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus and that, “[Congress’] attempt to revoke federal 
jurisdiction that the Supreme Court held to exist exceeds the powers of 
Congress.” Id. at 1007 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
223 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 
(Mar. 5, 2007). 
224 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (Apr. 2, 2007) (denying cert.); 
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process. Id. 
225 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29, 2007), vacating 127 
S. Ct. 1478 (April 2, 2007). 
226 Petitioners in Boumediene have been litigating their asserted rights to 
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detainees finally had the opportunity to present their argument to 
the Supreme Court on December 5, 2007. Petitioner detainees 
stressed the inadequacies of the CSRT process, arguing that the 
constitutional writ of habeas corpus extends to non-citizen 
detainees held at Guantanamo and thus that the court-stripping 
provision of the MCA is an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ.227 Petitioners went on to contend that while suspending 
habeas rights is a valid exercise of Congress’ authority if it provides 
an “adequate and effective alternative,”228 the CSRT process does 
not meet this standard.229 
In response, the government first argued that the constitutional 
writ of habeas corpus does not extend to non-citizens captured and 
detained abroad, and, alternatively, that Guantanamo detainees 
“enjoy more procedural protections than any other captured 
enemy combatants in the history of warfare.”230 The government 
maintained that detainees were provided an “adequate and effective 
alternative” for habeas in the form of the CSRT and D.C. Circuit 
Court review processes,231 and the Court should therefore exercise 
restraint and refrain from overruling long-respected precedent.232 
In light of the D.C. Circuit’s disposition in Bismullah, the 
petitioners in Boumediene and Al-Odah filed supplemental briefing 
with the Supreme Court after the oral argument on December 5, 
2007. In an attempt to buttress their constitutional challenge, 
petitioners cited Bismullah in support of their contention that the 
procedures set up by Congress to challenge CSRTs under the DTA 
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are clearly ineffective.233 Because the Supreme Court had signaled 
that its decision in Boumediene and Al-Odah “might be affected at 
least in part by what the Circuit Court [does] in Bismullah,”234 
detainees seized the opportunity to reinforce the arguments they 
made before the Court in early December. 
In the first of two supplemental briefs, detainees argued that 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision to deny the government’s motion for a 
rehearing en banc “does nothing to alleviate the fundamental 
structural inadequacies of the DTA review process as a substitute 
for habeas, and will only result in more delay.”235 In its second 
brief, filed just days later, detainees further argued that 
[t]he fractured nature of the D.C. Circuit’s recent action 
does not bode well for the future of DTA proceedings. 
There is ample reason to believe that the D.C. Circuit will 
continue to engage in divided, incremental decisionmaking 
on threshold procedural issues on which Congress has 
provided no guidance, thus making DTA review far less 
speedy than the centuries-old remedy of habeas.236 
Indeed, both briefs attempted to further emphasize the fact that the 
D.C. Circuit Court’s disposition in Bismullah would not resolve 
the overarching question of detainees’ rights. 
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C.  Congress 
Even if the Supreme Court takes the opportunity in 
Boumediene and Al-Odah to hold the court-stripping provision of 
the MCA unconstitutional, there is still the possibility that 
Congress may attempt to circumvent the ruling as it did in the 
wake of both Rasul and Hamdan.237 While some members of 
Congress have recognized that, “the elimination of basic legal rights 
undermines, not strengthens, [the] ability to achieve justice,”238 a 
vocal segment of Congress ardently maintains that habeas corpus 
does not, and indeed should not, extend to alien enemies captured 
and detained abroad in wartime.239 
Nonetheless, there is still the possibility for change: Senators 
Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Chairman and Ranking Member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee respectively, have repeatedly 
criticized Congress’ failure to repeal the court-stripping provision 
of the MCA, calling it “a historic error in judgment”240 and an 
attempt to “set back basic rights by some 900 years.”241 Moreover, 
several measures have been introduced in the House and the Senate 
that would have repealed the section of the MCA that stripped 
federal courts of their jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions 
and restored detainees’ right to habeas corpus.242 Unfortunately, 
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however, no measures have yet garnered enough support to pass 
through a House committee or overcome a Senate filibuster.243 
CONCLUSION 
Detainees at Guantanamo have only one form of procedural due 
process, and it is minimal at best: the D.C. Circuit Court can only 
review whether the CSRT in the detainee’s case complied with its 
own procedures.244 In order to preserve the legitimacy of American 
constitutional values and ensure the legitimacy of the CSRT 
system, detainees must be afforded basic procedural guarantees and 
a fair adversarial process during their initial CSRTs.245 The Framers 
of the Constitution recognized liberty as a preexisting natural right, 
and sought to protect it in the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.246 Recognition of Guantanamo detainees’ right to liberty 
might seem counterintuitive in the context of protecting the nation 
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from the threat of terrorism, but this does not serve as a 
justification for ignoring the right altogether. Rather, “[t]he concept 
that . . . constitutional protections against arbitrary government are 
inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency 
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and . . . would 
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the 
basis of our Government.”247 
The United States Constitution provides explicit procedural 
guarantees to protect against certain kinds of government action. 
However, those guarantees are more than just procedural 
protections. Provisions like the Fifth Amendment, which provides 
that, “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law,”248 stands for the proposition that we, 
as Americans, will not stand for or be party to abusive and 
arbitrary government encroachment on the right to liberty. 
Importantly, recognizing detainees’ liberty rights does not require 
that detainees be released or even that detainees be afforded the 
gamut of constitutional protections. The preservation of liberty 
merely requires that the process afforded to detainees maintain a 
basic adversarial structure and conform to traditional constitutional 
values. Rather than weaken the argument for providing detainees a 
more legitimate process for challenging their detention, the 
government’s interest in securing the nation against the threat of 
terrorism without sacrificing the constitutional principles that 
underlie our system of government highlights the need for adequate 
constitutional protection for detainees. 
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